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NORMS GOVERNING THE INTERSTATE USE OF FORCE: 




In this Article, the author argues against the standard view that there is no 
coherent and effective doctrine of international law regarding the interstate 
use of force. It is generally held that states interact with one another in a state 
of anarchy, at least when it comes to national security. After defining 
international law, I show that this is not completely accurate. Reflecting a 
status quo bias, classic invasions and territorial aggrandizement through force 
are illegal. Since 1945, states that have undertaken classic invasions have 
generally been sanctioned, and no state has taken territory from another by 
force since 1976. Part II presents a model that explains how norms not 
enforced by a centralized authority can have an impact on state behavior. I 
rely on political psychology and behavioral economics literature to show that 
the normative influence of law can cause states to refrain from attacking one 
another and the global community to sanction aggressors. The model as an 
explanatory tool is made even more plausible by investigations into earlier 
examples of the power of ideas to change state behavior and the finding that 
materialist or economic explanations of the status quo bias of international 




 ∗ Richard Hanania is a political science Ph.D. candidate at the University of California, Los Angeles. He 
received his J.D. from the University of Chicago Law School in 2013. 
HANANIA GALLEYSPROOFS 4/14/2014 10:24 AM 
830 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 
INTRODUCTION  .............................................................................................. 831 
A. Methods of Analysis  .................................................................... 834 
 I. THE STATUS QUO BIAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  .............................. 837 
A. What Is International Law?  ........................................................ 838 
B. The Illegality of Classic Invasions  ............................................. 845 
C. The Lack of International Consensus on Humanitarian 
Intervention  ................................................................................ 850 
D. The International Community and Responses to Terrorism  ....... 854 
E. The Grey Areas  ........................................................................... 859 
F. The General Pattern  ................................................................... 860 
G. Should We Thank (or Blame) International Law?  ...................... 863 
 II. WHAT DETERMINES WHICH NORMS ARE EFFECTIVE?  ...................... 868 
A. Why Do Some Norms Succeed?  .................................................. 869 
B. Case Studies  ............................................................................... 883 
1. The British Outlaw Slavery  .................................................. 884 
2. Postwar Decolonization  ....................................................... 889 
3. The Right to a Decent Standard of Living  ............................ 894 
C. The Inherent Appeal of the Status Quo Bias  ............................... 898 
1. The Ban on Classic Invasions ............................................... 898 
2. The Territorial Integrity Norm  ............................................. 900 
D. Towards an Abolition of War?  ................................................... 901 
CONCLUSION  .................................................................................................. 902 
  
HANANIA GALLEYSPROOFS 4/14/2014 10:24 AM 
2013] NORMS GOVERNING THE INTERSTATE USE OF FORCE 831 
INTRODUCTION 
Even among those who specialize in the subject, international law is a 
much-derided field. Contemporary textbooks on international law, unlike those 
covering other subjects, regularly begin with the question of whether it actually 
exists.1 This is not a new development. The first paragraph of Hans Kelsen’s 
Principles of International Law asks whether “so-called international law . . . 
[is] law in the same sense as national or municipal law?”2 To take a more 
recent example, two scholars begin their recent book with the observation that 
“[i]nternational law has long been burdened with the charge that it is not really 
law.”3 The main criticism is simple enough. Within a single country, the state 
enforces the law, but there is no third-party to ensure compliance with 
international law, often rendering it ineffective.4 Therefore, according to this 
line of analysis, states are best understood as units that are simply concerned 
with advancing their own interests, not legality.  
This criticism has been particularly salient when discussing the use of 
force. Maintaining peace between states has long been considered the central 
function of international law.5 Here, scholars conclude that the rules purporting 
to regulate interstate interactions, in particular Article 2(4) of the U.N. 
Charter,6 have been particularly ineffective.7 This appears to be a logical 
 
 1 See, e.g., BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (3d ed. 1999); ALINA 
KACZOROWSKA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (4th ed. 2010) (noting that “[t]he status of international law as 
‘law’ has been challenged at both the theoretical level . . . and at the practical level”); MALCOLM N. SHAW, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (5th ed. 2003); GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (7th ed. 1996) (“International law is to law as professional wrestling is to 
wrestling.” (quoting Stephen Budiansky, A New World’s Signs of Confusion, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 
20, 1993, at 8.)). 
 2 HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1966). 
 3 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2005). 
 4 SHAW, supra note 1, at 2–3. International law supposedly lacks the “identifying marks” of domestic 
law, such as “the existence of a recognised body to legislate or create laws, a hierarchy of courts with 
compulsory jurisdiction to settle disputes over such laws and an accepted system of enforcing those laws.” Id. 
 5 Ian Hurd, Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent World, 25 ETHICS & 
INT’L AFF. 293, 295 (2011) (“International law is centrally concerned with regulating war between 
states . . . .”); see, e.g., ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2d ed. 2005); MICHAEL J. 
GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERVENTIONISM AFTER KOSOVO 2 (2001). 
 6 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”), 
 7 Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 607, 607 
(2003) (citing Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force 
by States, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809, 836 (1970)). 
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extension of the idea that the lack of an enforcement mechanism is what makes 
international law meaningless. If decisions relating to the economy or the 
domestic justice system are too important to be controlled by unenforceable 
mandates from abroad, states certainly cannot be expected to act in 
conformance with international law in the area of national security. Despite the 
fact that the U.N. Charter prohibits one state from using force against another, 
except in self-defense or with Security Council approval,8 there have been at 
least “690 overt foreign military interventions between 1945 and 1996.”9 Some 
blame the supposed failures of international law to stop war for tarnishing the 
reputation of the entire field.10 Others maintain that, to the extent that it does 
restrain state behavior in the area of national security, the effects of 
international law have been pernicious.11 
This Article challenges these pessimistic conclusions. Part I shows that, 
despite claims that international law is ineffective, the concept is not 
meaningless with regards to the interstate use of force. Whether we look at the 
text of the U.N. Charter or actual state practice, some forms of state 
aggression, particularly seizing territory by force, are universally considered 
unacceptable.12 Violators of these norms face overwhelming sanctions from 
the world community. An analysis that uses both the text of the U.N. Charter 
and the “obey-or-be sanctioned” standard can help us find answers regarding 
the question of when the use of force by one state against another is illegal. 
Some illegal wars are outlawed both from the perspective of the U.N. Charter 
and customary international law. Even under the most stringent “state practice” 
standard, for example, one state seizing land from another is unquestionably 
prohibited.13 At the same time, certain uses of force that appear to be banned 
by the U.N. Charter have become accepted by the international community; 
this behavior may draw rhetorical condemnation but no meaningful sanctions. 
 
 8 U.N. Charter arts 50–51. 
 9 GLENNON, supra note 5, at 69. 
 10 CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 31 (“Some of the traditional skepticism about international law 
may be attributable to the extensive attention given to the highly indeterminate and often unobserved norms 
against the use of force . . . .”). 
 11 See John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 782–84 (2004). 
 12 Cf. id. at 780 (“[N]ations may use force to resist aggression that . . . seizes territory.”). 
 13 Id. State practice has been defined as “behaviors respecting a particular issue that amounts to direct 
action by, or has a direct effect on, the state whose behavior is in question.” A. Mark Weisburd, The 
International Court of Justice and the Concept of State Practice, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 295, 303 (2009). 
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Humanitarian intervention and limited strikes retaliating against terrorism 
appear to fall into this category.  
The fact that the world community punishes classic invasions goes a long 
way towards explaining why states do not initiate this type of war.14 At one 
level, this solves what has been called the compliance question, which asks 
why states would obey international law when it lacks an enforcement 
mechanism.15 On the other hand, this obscures the root of the problem, because 
it does not explain why third-parties to conflicts sanction aggressors. In the 
realist model, there is still a collective action problem: While it would be in the 
best interest of all members of the international community to enforce rules 
against aggression, every particular state is better off shirking its duty and 
hoping that others deal with the problem.16 To prevent this type of free riding 
in domestic law, the state exists to ensure that, for example, everyone pays 
their taxes or serves in wartime.17 The problem in interstate relations is the fact 
that there is no such “international leviathan.” If states do consistently sanction 
certain forms of aggression, as Part I shows, it only begs the question of what 
leads them do so. Part I closes by replying to those who argue that the decline 
of classic wars can be explained without invoking international law or global 
norms.18 
The compliance problem is dealt with in Part II, which shows that most 
states do not invade one another because their leaders and populations have 
internalized the proposition that classical invasions are immoral. The rule 
against classic invasions is so embedded and unquestioned that those who 
violate this norm shock the conscience of the international community and 
become pariahs, as is what happened after Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of 
Kuwait.19 Political scientists have shown that international law is most likely to 
 
 14 See infra Part I.B. 
 15 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2627–28 
(1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS (1995), and THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INSTITUTIONS (1995)). 
 16 See MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 
14 (2009). 
 17 Id. 
 18 See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 11, at 749 (“[L]eading political scientists and diplomatic historians attribute 
the reduced number of interstate wars and the stability of the international system generally during the Cold 
War period to the bipolar balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union.”). 
 19 See Franck, supra note 7, at 612. 
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affect interstate relations when it can create objective Schelling Points that can 
shape expectations.20 Building on the work of previous scholars, Part II 
presents a model that explains when an international norm is likely to be 
successful. As the rules composing the status quo bias are just the kind of 
norms that are likely to be respected, it is unsurprising that they have been 
followed. As will be shown, an embedded international norm virtually 
eliminating a certain practice is not new; the decline of slavery and colonialism 
are equivalent recent historical examples of the power of ideas, even without a 
third-party enforcer, to shape state conduct on the international plane. These 
norms share important similarities with the laws against classic invasions and 
seizing foreign territory: They are specific, inherently morally compelling, and 
at one point were backed by powerful norm entrepreneurs. Once one of these 
practices is considered immoral, logic dictates that the others also be 
forbidden.21 This Article ends with some thoughts on why understanding the 
current state of international law regarding the use of force is important and 
suggests that, before arguing for reform, future research and activism should 
take into account the fact that the current system has succeeded in maintaining 
a remarkable degree of stability. 
A. Methods of Analysis 
Many international law scholars who have incorporated lessons from 
international relations into their work have adopted the paradigm of realism, 
particularly in the area of the interstate use of force.22 Similar to the way 
classical economics derives insights from the aggregation of individual 
behavior, realism sees states as self-interested units seeking to maximize their 
own interests.23 At the extreme, states are like “billiard balls” with similar 
internal properties and structures; they all want the related aims of wealth and 
 
 20 See Paul K. Huth et al., Does International Law Promote the Peaceful Settlement of International 
Disputes? Evidence from the Study of International Conflicts Since 1945, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 415 (2011). 
Schelling Points “refer to coordination brought about (at least partly) by exploiting the salience of decision 
labels.” Vincent P. Crawford et. al., The Power of Focal Points Is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry 
May Yield Large Coordination Failures, 2008 AM. ECON. REV. 1443, 1443. 
 21 See infra text accompanying notes 309‒13. 
 22 Stephen M. Walt, International Relations: One World, Many Theories, 110 FOREIGN POL’Y, Spring 
1998, at 29 (Special Edition). 
 23 See id. at 29, 31. 
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security, and how they behave towards one another is based on relative 
power.24 
The influence of realism on international law is not surprising. It has been 
the most dominant school of thought in international relations since the end of 
World War II.25 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, one analysis 
shows that realism may have been eclipsed by more liberal schools of 
thought.26 Regardless, realism continues to be extremely influential, and has 
recently been used in international law scholarship.27 Realism stands in 
contrast to “constructivism,” which rather than taking state interests as given, 
analyzes international relations by taking account of how interests and 
identities are construed in a way that is endogenous to the process of 
interaction between countries.28 
Realism and constructivism begin to blur together when we remember that 
many realists take “ideational” preferences into consideration. Kathryn Sikkink 
shows that the foreign policies of many Western states began putting an 
emphasis on human rights after the end of the Second World War.29 She writes 
that “[t]he emergence of human rights policy is not a simple victory of ideas 
over interests. Rather, it demonstrates the power of ideas to reshape 
understandings of national interest.”30 Both of these sentences appear to 
describe very similar processes, and neither construction is obviously superior 
to the other. 
 
 24 Margarita H. Petrova, The End of the Cold War: A Battle or Bridging Ground Between Rationalist and 
Ideational Approaches in International Relations?, 9 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 115, 117 (2003) (citing JOHN J. 
MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2001)) (reviewing JEFFREY CHECKEL, IDEAS AND 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CHANGE: SOVIET/RUSSIAN BEHAVIOR AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR (1997), 
and ROBERT ENGLISH, RUSSIA AND THE IDEA OF THE WEST: GORBACHEV, INTELLECTUALS, AND THE END OF 
THE COLD WAR (2000), and JACQUES LÉVESQUE, THE ENIGMA OF 1989: THE USSR AND THE LIBERATION OF 
EASTERN EUROPE (1997)). 
 25 See Thomas C. Walker & Jeffrey S. Morton, Re-Assessing the “Power of Power Politics” Thesis: Is 
Realism Still Dominant?, 7 INT’L STUD. REV. 341, 342 (2005) (citing JOHN VASQUEZ, THE POWER OF POWER 
POLITICS: A CRITIQUE (2d ed. 1983)). 
 26 See id. at 350–53. 
 27 See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3; Stephen D. Krasner, Realist Views of International 
Law, 96 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 265 (2002); Yoo, supra note 11. 
 28 See Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 
46 INT’L ORG. 391, 393–94 (1992). 
 29 Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Principled Ideas, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 140 (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993). 
 30 Id. 
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In another example demonstrating the point that even realists take ideas 
seriously, Goldsmith and Posner acknowledge that some states may care about 
ideological preferences and human rights.31 On the other hand, they write that 
their analysis “consistently exclude[s] one preference from the state’s interest 
calculation: a preference for complying with international law.”32 This is 
because they do not believe that states care about international law as much as 
they do about economic or security interests.33 
This Article does not contend that states care more about following 
international law per se than they do about other interests that might weigh 
against compliance. Rather, it argues that world leaders have a significant 
desire to comply with the most important rule of international law: the ban on 
classic invasions. Or, compliance is now in the “national interest” of most 
states. The language adopted is not important; what matters is the explanatory 
power of the theory presented as to why states follow international rules 
regarding the interstate use of force, even when doing so does not bring greater 
security or economic growth. 
This Article breaks with realism by putting less emphasis on the concern 
with traditional areas of national interest like economic growth and security. If 
citizens only cared about that, few international collective action problems 
would be overcome. Also, realism underestimates the extent to which leaders 
adopt a “logic of appropriateness” in making international relations decisions 
and the potential for certain rules to be morally compelling across practically 
all of the world’s cultures. At the same time, the Article disagrees with the 
more extreme claims of constructivists who imply that human nature, and thus 
the concept of what counts as a state interest, is nearly infinitely malleable.34 
The approach is agnostic towards the efficacy of international law in general, 
but more optimistic about its influences when certain conditions are met. In the 
future, rather than focusing on the compliance problem as a general matter, 
legal scholars would be better served by differentiating between separate rules 
 
 31 Cf. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, at 6 (distinguishing themselves from realists “who assume 
that a state’s interests are limited to security and (perhaps) wealth”). 
 32 Id. at 9. 
 33 Id. at 10 (“It is unenlightening to explain international law compliance in terms of a preference for 
complying with international law.”) 
 34 See J. Samuel Barkin, Realist Constructivism, 5 INT’L STUD. REV. 325, 330 (2003) (“There exist 
theories of human nature that are incompatible with political realism, including those that argue that human 
nature is infinitely malleable or ultimately perfectible.”). 
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of international law and asking how effectively certain global norms apply 
towards different subject matters. 
I. THE STATUS QUO BIAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Just as it is often said that international law does not exist as a general 
matter, scholars argue that there is no coherent doctrine governing the 
interstate use of force in particular.35 After NATO’s bombing of Kosovo in 
1999, many of those who believed that the war violated the U.N. Charter 
declared the document a dead letter.36 In 1970, Thomas Franck argued that the 
attempts made by the United Nations to regulate the interstate use of force had 
failed, as states were still fighting wars without facing sanctions.37 He revisited 
that same theme thirty-three years later, seeing the 2003 invasion of Iraq as 
confirming his earlier view.38 Glennon writes that between 1945 and 1980, 
there were one hundred armed conflicts that killed over 25 million people, in 
addition to thirty major continuing wars as of 1998.39 Like Franck, Glennon 
presents this as proof that the United Nations and the international community 
in general have been unsuccessful in their collective efforts to prevent war.40 
Other scholars argue that even if international law exists in some abstract 
sense, international legal norms do not actually influence state behavior.41 
When describing the role of law in affecting state decisions regarding the use 
of force, any dissimilarities between those who deny the existence of relevant 
rules and those who believe that those rules are meaningless are more apparent 
than real. It is not easy to find scholars who defend the current state of affairs, 
or even argue that there is some coherence underlying the way that the 
international community reacts to interstate aggression. 
This Part contends that these conclusions judge international law by 
unrealistic standards and rely on certain conceptual mistakes. A less ambitious 
conception of what international law can accomplish can provide an 
 
 35 See Franck, supra note 7, at 607–08. 
 36 See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 62. 
 37 See Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by 
States, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809, 809–10, 835–36 (1970). 
 38 Franck, supra note 7, at 607–08. 
 39 GLENNON, supra note 5, at 67–69. 
 40 Id. at 1–2. 
 41 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, at 3 (submitting that international law does not influence 
state behavior, but that state behavior influences international law). 
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appreciation for our current period of remarkable peace and more realistic 
expectations regarding potential international law reforms. While this Article 
argues that a well-functioning and logically consistent doctrine of international 
law regarding the use of force exists, this does not necessarily mean that the 
world has eliminated all armed conflict. Rather, international law has 
succeeded in placing limits on the kinds of conflicts that have been the most 
destructive. This Part begins with a discussion of the general concept of 
international law and its origins.42 In determining the state of the law regarding 
the interstate use of force, there are two main tools of analysis: the U.N. 
Charter and the obey-or-be-sanctioned standard.43 From there, this Article 
shows that certain kinds of interstate force can coherently be called illegal, 
while others are legal, and yet others fall somewhere in a kind of grey area.44 
Finally, this Part briefly discusses some alternative theories that seek to explain 
the decline of the classic invasion and describes their shortcomings.45 
A. What Is International Law? 
Traditionally, there have been two sources of international law.46 The first 
is treaties, which are written agreements signed by the relevant officials of two 
or more states.47 Emer de Vattel wrote that rulers of states are independent, 
sovereign, and equal.48 Through treaties, countries could bind their own future 
behavior.49 Because of this, the rules governing interstate interactions have 
been said to be consent based.50 The second source of international law is 
custom. A practice is part of customary international law when a large portion 
of states usually engage, or refrain from engaging, in the relevant act, and do 
so at least partly out of a sense of moral obligation.51 The latter requirement is 
 
 42 See infra Part I.A. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See infra Part I.B. 
 45 See infra Part I.G. 
 46 See Krasner, supra note 27, at 265. 
 47 See e.g., DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 26 (3d ed. 2010). 
 48 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE 
CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS WITH THREE EARLY ESSAYS ON THE ORIGIN AND 
NATURE OF NATURAL LAW AND ON LUXURY 68 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., 2008) (1773). 
 49 Id. at 77. 
 50 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, at 26. 
 51 Id. at 23; SHAW, supra note 1, at 70–71; J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International 
Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 451–52 (2000). 
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referred to as opinio juris.52 This appears to be sensible, as without a third-
party enforcer of international law, early modern theorists could only put their 
faith in the consciences of sovereigns. 
Because the U.N. Charter has virtually unanimous consent,53 it is where 
any discussion about the legality of state use of force must begin. The 
normative and legitimizing value of the document goes beyond that of a 
normal treaty; to many, it has the characteristics of an “international 
constitution.”54 Scholars constantly debate whether instances of interstate uses 
of force are consistent with the U.N. Charter, while assuming that it has 
superseded any legal rules that preceded it.55 Diplomats and politicians also 
regularly cite the document to support their positions.56 Reflecting the concerns 
of the United Nation’s founding generation, Article 1 lists the purposes of the 
organization, with the first being “[t]o maintain international peace and 
security.”57 The Charter echoes Vattel and other founders of international law 
in granting all member states sovereign equality.58 Article 2(4) contains what is 
likely the most important sentence in the history of international law: “All 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”59 
This seemingly unequivocal rule against the use of force is softened by 
Article 51, which states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
 
 52 Opinio juris “is the central concept of customary international law . . . [and] refers to the reason a state 
acts in accordance with behavioral regularity.” Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 3, at 23. 
 53 See 1 UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: 
STATUS AS AT 1 APRIL 2009, at 5–10, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/26, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.3 (2009), for a list 
of signatories to the United Nations Charter. 
 54 Russell S. Sobel, The League of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter: An Analysis of 
Two International Constitutions, 5 CONST. POL. ECON. 173, 173 (1994); see also Bardo Fassbender, The 
United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529, 
566–68 (1998) (“The United Nations is the primary institutional representative of the international 
community.”). 
 55 See generally Franck, supra note 35, at 836; Yoo, supra note 11. 
 56 Yoo, supra note 11, at 769, 771. 
 57 U.N. Charter art. 4, para. 1. 
 58 Id. art. 2, para. 1. 
 59 Id. art. 2, para. 4. 
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the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”60 The 
Security Council is given the exclusive right to “determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and decide on an 
appropriate response.61 If necessary to enforce its recommendations, the 
Security Council can mandate the use of force against the party that it decides 
is the aggressor.62 
Thus, the U.N. Charter outlines when countries may use force and provides 
guidance for action when the Charter has been breached. And from a purely 
textual perspective, it appears that international law bans the interstate use of 
force except in two circumstances: in self-defense or with the approval of the 
Security Council, as long as it finds a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression.”63 Importantly, the Charter does authorize the use of force 
for any reason, so long as the Security Council approves. Reflecting the era in 
which the United Nations was founded, a dispute must have an international 
dimension for the world community to have the right to intervene. 
While the Charter is clearly the most important treaty that matters 
regarding the legality of interstate uses of force, it is difficult to infer the rules 
of customary international law. Criticisms have been raised regarding the 
determination of what rules, norms, or practices qualify.64 These criticisms 
have caused some scholars to disfavor the use of customary international law 
as a means of legal analysis.65 Traditional criteria provide little guidance in 
determining how broadly or narrowly to treat an international precedent.66 For 
example, NATO’s bombing of Kosovo can be seen as evidence that customary 
practice allows: (1) general humanitarian intervention; (2) an alliance of states 
to attack an individual state without Security Council approval; or (3) a 
federation of democracies to attack a non-democracy.67 Even this list does not 
exhaust the universe of plausible interpretations. Without something equivalent 
to the U.S. Supreme Court to decide how precedents apply, there is no way to 
 
 60 Id. art. 51 
 61 Id. art. 39. 
 62 Id. art. 42. 
 63 Id. art. 39. 
 64 See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 41–42. 
 65 Id. at 42–45. 
 66 Id. at 50. 
 67 See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 49–51. 
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single out any one of the possible interpretations for any particular state act as 
“correct.”68 
Even if state practice can be established, there is still the difficulty of 
determining whether states comply with a rule out a sense of moral obligation. 
For instance, in the domestic sphere, public choice theorists have shown that 
there will be situations where a legislature cannot be said to have an “intent” 
behind its laws.69 Similarly, it follows that a state’s actions on the international 
plane may have no clear intent behind them. Some individuals within a 
government may be acting out of moral conviction, while others might agree 
with the first group out of self-interest or a desire not to disturb superiors. 
States might engage in or refrain from an act for any number of reasons, or no 
real individual reason at all. 
Ignoring the logic of public choice and assuming that a sovereign intent 
always exists still does not solve the problem. Psychological motives of world 
leaders are hard to prove and another explanation of why a state acted the way 
it did could always be created. For example, if states do not regularly invade 
the territory of others, an international lawyer might argue that this shows that 
the test of opinio juris is satisfied. But as Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner point 
out, this could reflect, among other things, a coincidence of interests or an 
equilibrium resulting from a repeated, bilateral prisoner’s dilemma.70 If two 
neighboring states with similar levels of military and economic power refrain 
from attacking one another, it is plausible that they avoid war because a cost-
benefit calculation on each side shows invading to be illogical. For the 
purposes of customary international law, however, this restraint must be the 
result of a sense of moral obligation on the part of rulers, and there is no reason 
to assume that this is the case simply because state practice is consistent with 
such a theory. 
A final problem with the concept of customary international law is that it 
may seem doubtful that the world community—representing all of the globe’s 
different cultures, traditions and histories—can actually agree on many 
 
 68 Id. at 51–52. 
 69 Frank H. Easterbrook, Statute’s Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 1983) (“Because legislatures 
comprise many members, they do not have ‘intents’ or ‘designs’ hidden yet discoverable.”). But see Daniel A. 
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 425 (1988) (“[T]he 
notion of a coherent legislative intent is consistent with current public choice theory.”). 
 70 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, at 26–35. 
HANANIA GALLEYSPROOFS 4/14/2014 10:24 AM 
842 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 
norms.71 This is not the same as philosophical cultural relativism. Even natural 
law theorists see international law as consent based.72 What it does mean is 
that opinio juris depends on what states believe is moral, regardless of whether 
we hold that certain cultural values are “wrong” in any absolute sense. It seems 
correct that while we may have been able to establish rules of customary 
international law when the only states that mattered were European or 
European-derived, a more inclusive analysis would be much more difficult. 
The theories underlying both sources of international law, treaties and 
custom, presume that international law does not have a third-party enforcer.73 
This leads to the realist criticism that international law has little to no effect on 
the behavior of world leaders.74 This view discounts the possibility of state 
enforcement because of the collective action problems involved.75 It seems 
intuitively correct that if the international community consistently punishes 
certain behavior, only then can that behavior be considered unlawful. The 
plausibility of this vision is today questioned by realists, while in earlier times 
scholars argued against its normative desirability.76 Not only did traditional 
international law often ignore the possibility of states acting as enforcers, but 
Vattel considered such a proposition immoral.77 Despite these concerns, if 
states consistently punish certain kinds of actions, and a ready explanation 
based on state interests appears to be lacking, an inference may be drawn that 
leaders are acting out of normative considerations. This is especially true if a 
series of independent international norms are logically consistent with one 
another, all seeming to rely on a larger coherent moral framework.78 
The early nineteenth century saw legal positivism rise to prominence, and 
international law was swept up with the larger trend.79 Representing that same 
approach a century later, Kelsen argued that law could be distinguished from 
other societal practices that attempt to shape behavior, such as norms and 
 
 71 Kelly, supra note 51, at 466–75. 
 72 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, at 26. 
 73 Id. at 3. 
 74 See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, at 3. 
 75 See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 16, at 1–3. 
 76 VATTEL, supra note 48, at 256. 
 77 Id. at 265. 
 78 See infra Part II.A. 
 79 Josef L. Kunz, Natural-Law Thinking in the Modern Science of International Law, 55 AM. J. INT’L L. 
947, 952 (1961). 
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rational persuasion, by the element of coercion.80 A certain act is a delict when 
it is accompanied by a sanction handed out by a valid authority.81 Under this 
analysis the question of whether international law exists depends on whether 
certain acts considered violations of the norms of the world community are 
actually punished.82 International organizations may legitimize coercion, but 
individual states must act as the sanctioners.83 
A. Mark Weisburd adopts this positivist approach to determine the state of 
the law in the area of interstate armed conflict.84 To find general patterns about 
whether some kinds of force consistently draw meaningful sanctions, he 
documents over 110 instances of states using force against one another 
between 1945 and 1991.85 Under the “obey-or-be sanctioned” standard, these 
punishments have to go beyond mere rhetorical condemnation and 
significantly hamper the aggressor’s war effort or other goals.86 Just because 
some states use force against others does not mean that there are no rules of 
international law regarding the use of force,87 in the same way that people 
occasionally kill one another despite the illegality of murder. Such an analysis 
ignores the applicable sanctions along with the deterrence these sanctions 
achieve. In the words of Hans Kelsen: 
If a definite conduct is prescribed or permitted, the possibility of a 
contrary conduct is of course presupposed. If theft were impossible, 
the norm “You shall not steal” would be meaningless . . . . Only 
because a certain conduct is made by law the condition of a sanction 
is this conduct a delict, or what amounts to the same, is this behavior 
legally prohibited.88 
We may add that, for a rule to qualify as law, it is not necessary that every 
single time it is violated, punishment follows. All that is necessary is that 
sanctions are able to stop and deter instances of the unlawful behavior to some 
 
 80 Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L. REV. 44, 57–58 
(1941) (“[T]he essential characteristic of law, by which it is distinguished from all other social mechanisms, is 
the fact that it seeks to bring about socially desired conduct by acting against contrary socially undesired 
conduct—the delict—with a sanction which the individual involved will deem an evil.”). 
 81 Id.; KELSEN, supra note 2, at 6–7. 
 82 KELSEN, supra note 2, at 16–17. 
 83 Id. at 20. 
 84 See A. MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II, at 4 (1997). 
 85 Id. at 308. 
 86 See id. at 8. 
 87 See FRANCK, supra note 7; GLENNON, supra note 5. 
 88 KELSEN, supra note 2, at 6–7. 
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satisfactory degree. Little more can be asked of any norm worthy of being 
called “law.” 
In determining the state of the law regarding the interstate use of force, the 
methodology adopted here gives credence to both the text and original intent of 
the U.N. Charter and the obey-or-be sanctioned standard. This Article rejects 
the position that only the U.N. Charter can determine what is lawful.89 The 
U.N. Charter at the very least carries normative weight with the world 
community. This is reflected, for example, in the condemnation of the United 
States for its 2003 invasion of Iraq without Security Council approval.90 
Diplomats and leaders reference the text of the U.N. Charter along with what 
the Security Council has done to argue for or against different policies.91 On 
the other hand, focusing only on the U.N. Charter is to maintain formal 
coherence at the cost of real world relevance. Glennon is correct that not all, 
and probably not most, violations of the strict letter of Article 2(4) are 
punished.92 But to classify all interstate uses of force—the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, the United States overthrowing the Taliban government, Saudi 
Arabia sending troops to Bahrain to crush a Shiite rebellion, etc.—the same 
way would be a conceptual mistake.  
For instance, Weisburd has divided all interstate uses of force between 
1945 and 1991 into different categories to see whether some kinds of attacks 
are more acceptable to the world community than others.93 In the process of 
reviewing his work, his main findings can be connected to other international 
relations scholarship and provide a similar analysis of humanitarian 
intervention, a type of war that was rare to nonexistent before the end of the 
Cold War. While there is some arbitrariness involved in Weisburd’s method of 
dividing instances of interstate uses of force into different categories, this does 
not prevent classification.94 While certain wars will fall at the margins of any 
category in which they are placed, classifications are both possible and 
 
 89 See Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 
130 (1986) (arguing that state conduct cannot nullify Article 2(4)). 
 90 See, e.g., CLYDE V. PRESTOWITZ, ROGUE NATION: AMERICAN UNILATERALISM AND THE FAILURE OF 
GOOD INTENTIONS 276–77 (2004); Yoo, supra note 11, at 729–30. 
 91 Cf. Schachter, supra note 89, at 118, 121–22 (explaining how states view the text of the U.N. Charter 
and Security Council resolutions). 
 92 See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 61–62. 
 93 WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 25–27. 
 94  See infra Part I.B. 
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necessary, and, as seen below, can show normative agreement among members 
of the international community. 
Furthermore, the text of the U.N. Charter is inadequate to determine the 
state of international law regarding the use of force, because doubts existed on 
whether the United Nations would eliminate all war at the time of the U.N.’s 
founding. Several founding U.N. members seemingly violated the plain text of 
Article 2(4) within the first decade of the organization’s existence. For 
example, Great Britain unilaterally used force against Yemen in 1949 and the 
United States did so against Guatemala in 1954.95 While this may simply be 
explained away as great power hypocrisy, the history of the founding of the 
United Nations indicates that Article 2(4) was meant to apply mainly to the 
kinds of conflict that had triggered the two world wars—what is referred to 
below as the classic invasion.96 It is not realistic to believe that the U.N. 
founders thought that they would succeed in abolishing all kinds of interstate 
armed conflict, even if the concept may have been seen as an ideal to aspire 
towards. 
In the methodology used here, when a type of state conduct both violates 
the Charter and draws international sanctions, then it can unquestionably be 
considered illegal. On the other hand, when a type of action is allowed by the 
Charter and state practice, it is lawful under international law. The most 
difficult cases, of course, are those where the U.N. Charter and state practice 
diverge, as what arguably has happened in the case of humanitarian 
intervention. While any definitive answer on the legality of these kinds of grey 
area conflicts will have to depend on methodological preferences, it is deeply 
problematic to consider humanitarian intervention legal, especially when 
carried out without Security Council approval. 
B. The Illegality of Classic Invasions 
Because the United Nations was created in reaction to World War II, an 
analysis of the legality of war should start with the case of the classic invasion, 
which is the kind of conflict that conforms best to the idea of what a 
prototypical “war” is. Precise, universally recognized national borders are a 
relatively recent phenomenon, dating back to no earlier than the eighteenth 
 
 95 WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 209–11, 255. 
 96 See infra Part I.B. 
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century.97 From the time these first borders were drawn to the signing of the 
U.N. Charter, disputes over territory were the main causes of war.98 This is 
why the Charter bans the use of force against the “territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state.”99 The implication of the text is that, for an 
aggressor state to be violating Article 2(4), the target country must already 
have a certain degree of “territorial integrity” and/or “political independence.” 
“And” makes more sense than “or” in this context because the implication of 
Article 2(4) is that a fully formed sovereign state has both. By violating the 
“territorial integrity or political independence” of a well-established state, an 
aggressor is thus acting in a way inconsistent with international law. 
Weisburd discusses ten cases of “classic invasions” in the world between 
1945 and 1991.100 He defines classic invasions as conflicts which satisfy the 
following six conditions: (1) The war involves a border crossing by regular 
troops of the state(s) initiating the use of force; (2) the border(s) crossed 
separate states; (3) the border(s) crossed have been recognized by the 
combatants for some time; (4) the purpose of the invasion is either to subjugate 
the state invaded, to seize a portion of its territory, or to replace an unfriendly 
government; (5) the invaded state, did not, prior to the invasion, stand in a 
position of de facto subordination to the invading state; and (6) the conflict 
cannot be seen as a continuation of earlier hostilities between the combatants 
that had ended without resolving the basic disputes between them.101 
This Article will add one more part to Weisburd’s definition: the war must 
not be a humanitarian intervention.102 The analysis leads to some important 
conclusions. First, few classic invasions have occurred at all. Over a forty-six 
year period, there have been ten classic invasions, averaging to one every 4.6 
years. The break with the past is more striking considering that there are more 
states today than there were before the founding of the United Nations. Just as 
importantly, six of the postwar classic invasions were met with significant 
international sanctions, which went beyond moral condemnation of the 
 
 97 Mark W. Zacher, The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force, 55 
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 99 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 100 WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 28–59. 
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 102 See infra Part I.C. 
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aggressor.103 In five of those six cases, the sanctions from the international 
community were an important reason behind the failure of the aggressor state’s 
war effort.104 
Perhaps the postwar conflict closest to the ideal of the prototypical classic 
invasion has been Iraq’s attempt to annex Kuwait in 1990.105 One universally 
recognized sovereign entity with clear borders attempted to use force to annex 
and end the independent legal existence of another.106 On August 2, 1990, 
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.107 A few days later, the Security Council 
responded by announcing its intent “to restore the authority of the legitimate 
Government of Kuwait” and to that end adopted heavy economic sanctions 
against the aggressor.108 After a few weeks, it authorized a naval blockade, 
which twenty-three states helped enforce,109 and finally, in Resolution 678, 
threatened military action if Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 
1991.110 After that deadline passed, an international coalition finally enforced 
these resolutions and expelled Saddam Hussein’s army, restoring the Kuwaiti 
government.111 The Iraqi forces were badly overmatched and the entire effort 
took less than two months.112 There was consensus on the need to use military 
force among a broad cross section of states. Resolution 678 was opposed by 
only two non-permanent members of the Security Council113 and supported by 
all the permanent members except China, who abstained from the vote. The 
mission included financial or military support from, among others, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Canada, 
South Korea, and Australia.114 Eastern, Western, and Arab states agreed that 
one member of the United Nations annexing another by force was 
unacceptable.115 
 
 103 WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 58–62. 
 104 Id. at 59. 
 105 In a world that accepted Hobbesian anarchy in international relations such an invasion would have 
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 106 See WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 55–56. 
 107 Id. at 56. 
 108 S.C. Res. 661, paras. 2–5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990). 
 109 S.C. Res. 665, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (Aug. 25, 1990); WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 57. 
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The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan similarly saw wide-ranging 
sanctions applied against the aggressor. This example further proves the 
existence of a ban on classic invasions, because it involves a state much more 
economically and militarily powerful than Iraq was at the time of the Gulf 
War. In June 1978, rural Afghans began a revolt against their Marxist 
government, which itself had only recently come to power in a coup.116 About 
a year and a half later, the Soviet government invaded to preserve Afghanistan 
as a functioning communist border-state.117 The opponents of the Afghan 
Marxists and Soviets, mostly religiously-motivated guerillas collectively 
known as the mujahideen, received arms from China, the United States, 
Pakistan, and Iran.118 Also in reaction to the war, the United States pulled out 
of an arms treaty it was in the process of negotiating with the Soviet Union.119 
The Soviet Union also suffered economic sanctions at the hands of the United 
States, Canada, and the European Community, and diplomatic sanctions from 
several states, including those represented by Western, communist, and Islamic 
governments.120 In each year from 1980 to 1987, the General Assembly passed 
a resolution calling for all foreign troops to withdraw from Afghanistan.121 All 
of this pressure is thought to have contributed to Mikhail Gorbachev’s decision 
to pull all his soldiers out of Afghanistan in the late 1980s.122 
Both the Iraqi and Soviet invasions saw third-party sanctions on the 
aggressor state that were used as a conduit for expressing, and sometimes 
enforcing, the positions of the international community.123 Considerations of 
power may explain why Iraq was invaded because of its actions but the Soviet 
Union was not. Regardless, even the Soviets were sanctioned for invading a 
state that was, as an independent force, powerless on the international plane. 
With such overwhelming global reactions to classic invasions, it is not 
surprising that wars fought over territory have ceased to exist, resulting in a 
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“territorial integrity norm.”124 Between 1648 and 1945, ninety-three out of 119 
armed conflicts could be classified as “territorial wars,” defined as wars 
“concerned with . . . issues that clearly involve state control over territory.”125 
Eighty percent of territorial conflicts resulted in a redistribution of territory.126 
But for the time period from 1945 to 2000, there were forty territorial wars, 
and less than thirty percent led to a change in international borders.127 Even the 
few post-World War II cases of territorial aggrandizement through war were 
concentrated during the period of decolonization.128 Since 1976, no country 
has successfully used force to take territory from another state.129 Perhaps even 
more impressively, no country has disappeared as a result of conquest since 
1945.130 The normal international reaction to classic invasions explains why. 
These are no small accomplishments. The two world wars were essentially 
territorial conflicts between the world’s most powerful states.131 But as of 
2012, no two superpowers have fought one another on the battlefield for fifty-
nine years, the longest such streak in recorded history.132 And classic invasions 
have not only disappeared among the major states but amongst practically all 
countries. International sanctions must figure heavily in any state’s cost-benefit 
calculation regarding whether or not to overthrow a neighbor or seize its 
territory. The only mystery that remains to be solved is why third-parties have 
been willing to act as enforcers, when rational choice theory would expect 
states to shirk any responsibility for maintaining international stability.133 
 
 124 Zacher, supra note 97, at 215. 
 125 Id. at 218, 223. 
 126 Id. at 223. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 245. 
 129 Id. at 244. This is not to say that there have not been cases of international borders being redrawn as 
the result of a region breaking away from a larger state. In 2011, for example, the international community 
recognized the independence of South Sudan. Jeffrey Gettleman, Newest Nation Is Full of Hope and Problems, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2011, at A1. 
 130 STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 251 (2011) 
(noting that the unification of South Vietnam and North Vietnam may be an exception depending upon how 
the conflict between the two states is characterized). 
 131 See, e.g., John C. Duncan, Jr., Following a Sigmoid Progression: Some Jurisprudential and Practical 
Considerations Regarding Territorial Acquisition Among Nation-States, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 6, 
26–27, 31–32. 
 132 See PINKER, supra note 130, at 250. 
 133 See supra text accompanying notes 15–17. 
HANANIA GALLEYSPROOFS 4/14/2014 10:24 AM 
850 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 
C. The Lack of International Consensus on Humanitarian Intervention 
After the end of the Cold War, the idea of humanitarian intervention 
became popular among Western leaders and opinion-makers.134 A 
humanitarian intervention has been defined as a situation where a state or 
coalition of states invades a country without the permission of the target 
government to nominally, “and at least to some extent actually,” stop some sort 
of atrocity.135 Because such wars involve major violations of sovereignty and 
often result in the overthrow of the offending government, these wars can fit 
the definition of a classic invasion.136  
Since the end of the Cold War, however, analysis of the legality of the use 
of force has removed humanitarian interventions from the larger category of 
classic invasions. International lawyers have given the topic its own 
specialized focus.137 And while the world community’s reactions, both 
rhetorically and with regards to sanctions, to classic invasions have been 
overwhelmingly negative, powerful states have supported using force against 
sovereign governments for the sake of defending human rights. Therefore, 
humanitarian intervention should have its own special category. 
There have been at least three cases of humanitarian interventions in the 
post-Cold War era: the international community’s intervention in Somalia and 
NATO’s wars against the governments of the former Yugoslavia and Libya. In 
the cases of Somalia and Libya, the missions at least partly had the blessings of 
the United Nations, while the bombing of Kosovo did not.138 With or without 
Security Council approval, humanitarian interventions appear to be illegal 
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under the plain meaning of the text of the U.N. Charter.139 Not only does the 
document ban the use of force except in self-defense or when the Security 
Council finds a threat to international security, but it states that “[n]othing 
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state.”140 
According to the Charter, the United Nations has no role in stopping 
intrastate humanitarian disasters. Further evidence against the legality of 
humanitarian intervention comes from the documents relating to the Charter’s 
founding.141 While originalism142 has been put in different terms when applied 
to treaties, the justification for its use as a tool to analyze the U.N. Charter is 
just as strong as the justifications commonly offered for the method in 
domestic constitutional law. If countries are morally or legally bound to obey 
treaties, because they previously agreed to them, then they can only be obliged 
to follow the terms to which they consented. This idea has long been accepted 
by the international community. The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, for example, allows the preparatory work from the time of adoption 
to be used in the interpretation of treaties.143 
Scholars who have examined the travaux préparatoires of the U.N. Charter 
and other historical evidence have shown that the founders did not believe that 
they had created an organization that was to deal primarily,144 if at all, with 
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intrastate human rights violations.145 For example, in deliberations preceding 
the adoption of the Charter, members of the U.S. Senate suggested that “a 
threat of force or violence” was necessary for the United Nations to interfere in 
the affairs of a state.146 In the words of Tom Farer, “if one deems the original 
intention of the founding members to be controlling with respect to the 
legitimate occasions for the use of force, humanitarian intervention is 
illegal.”147 
Of course, one could reject using only the travaux préparatoires to 
determine the meaning of the U.N. Charter. Thomas Franck calls the Charter a 
“living document” and argues that, unlike most international agreements, it 
created a brand new international organization and was meant to keep pace 
with evolving norms.148 The second clause of Article 2(7), after all, says that 
the principle of nonintervention does not apply when the United Nations is 
undertaking “enforcement measures under Chapter VII,” the part of the 
document which allows the Security Council to decide when a “threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” exists.149 Therefore, Franck 
argues that humanitarian interventions approved by the Security Council can 
be considered legal, even if the definitions of the terms in the phrase “threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” need to be expanded from 
their original meanings.150 On the other hand, Franck maintains that 
humanitarian interventions not approved by the Security Council are not 
permitted by the U.N. Charter.151 
The argument about the legality of humanitarian intervention with the 
consent of the Security Council comes down to whether the organization is 
allowed to define its own mission and whether we should give greater weight 
to original meaning of the U.N. Charter or current state practices. In practical 
terms, if the Security Council approves of a war, that means that all the major 
powers are in agreement. Under such circumstances, the intervention will take 
place and no state or coalition can be expected to stop it. Also, such an effort 
 
 145 See FRANCK, supra note 141; Farer, supra note 143, at 119–20 (“Nothing in the travaux préparatoires 
suggests that the parties envisioned a government’s treatment of its own nationals as a likely catalyst of a 
threat or breach.”). 
 146 GLENNON, supra note 5, at 108–09. 
 147 Farer, supra note 143, at 121. 
 148 FRANCK, supra note 141, at 6–7. 
 149 U.N. Charter art. 2 para. 7, art. 39. 
 150 FRANCK, supra note 141, at 5. 
 151 Id. at 135–39. 
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can be expected to have a great deal of legitimacy. Therefore, arguing about 
legality under such circumstances has few real world implications. If all major 
powers support a humanitarian intervention, it will happen and the attacking 
states will not face sanctions as a result. However, in cases where the 
permanent members of the Security Council disagree on the need to use 
military force to stop an atrocity, we can still benefit from a debate about 
legality. 
Under the obey-or-be sanctioned standard, humanitarian intervention, with 
or without Security Council approval, should not be considered illegal. The 
instigators of the three main wars of the post-Cold War era that fall into this 
category have not been sanctioned. The 1990s intervention in Somalia was 
supported and legitimized by several Security Council resolutions.152 While the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo was condemned by Russia, China, and India,153 
the United States and its allies did not suffer serious consequences. Finally, 
although certain countries complained during and after the attack on Libya, 
NATO was not seriously sanctioned for overthrowing Muammar Gaddafi.154 
Therefore, while humanitarian intervention may be illegal under the text 
and original meaning U.N. Charter, it is permitted under the obey-or-be 
sanctioned standard. The United States and its allies have not faced serious 
consequences for imposing their will on or even overthrowing weaker states to 
stop governments from committing atrocities against their own citizens. Still, it 
is difficult to believe that less powerful countries would be able to violate the 
sovereignty of other states with impunity even if they made a plausible case 
that they were defending human rights. 
Even if we treat the U.N. Charter as a “living constitution,” it does not 
follow that humanitarian intervention has become legal through state practice. 
A “living constitution” at least requires that a significant portion of the relevant 
 
 152 See S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992); S.C. Res. 751, U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (Apr. 
24, 1992); S.C. Res. 746, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/746 (Mar. 17, 1992); S.C. Res. 733, U.N. Doc. S/RES/733 
(Jan. 23, 1992). 
 153 See NATO Air Strikes—The World Reacts, B.B.C. NEWS (Mar. 25, 1999, 4:47 PM), http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/2/hi/303446.stm. 
 154 See, e.g., Scott Bobb, Several African Leaders Criticize Air Attacks in Libya, VOICE OF AM. (Mar. 22, 
2011, 8:00 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/several-african-leaders-criticize-air-attacks-in-libya-
118435599/136876.html (“South African President Jacob Zuma has warned that the Western-led bombings of 
Libyan military installations must not target civilians.”); Patrick Wintour & Ewen MacAskill, Gaddafi May 
Become Target of Air Strikes, Liam Fox Admits, GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2011, 5:37 PM), http://www.guardian. 
co.uk/world/2011/mar/20/coalition-criticism-arab-league-libya?INTCMP=SRCH. 
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community actually accept any change. Despite the broad support for 
humanitarian intervention on the part of NATO member-states, the concept has 
been more controversial in Russia and China,155 which are two of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council and together make up nearly a 
quarter of the world’s population. In reaction to the Kosovo War, “114 
member states of the Non-Aligned Movement condemned humanitarian 
intervention in 2000.”156 The Somalia intervention may have had international 
support, but at the time, the country had no functioning government.157 
International forces did cross an established border, but no authority had 
enough effective control over the country for us to be able to say that its 
sovereign rights were violated.158 The agreement of the United States, Great 
Britain, and a handful of other Western states does not alone form an 
international consensus. 
The legal status of humanitarian intervention stands in sharp contrast to that 
of classic invasions. Without any kind of international consensus regarding 
humanitarian wars, efforts to protect civilians from their own government are 
taken on an ad hoc basis and usually controversial. At best, there is a spectrum 
of legality in this area of law, with Security Council-approved missions and 
those in countries with no functioning governments more legal than those 
undertaken when the opposite conditions apply. But certainly all humanitarian 
interventions could be considered illegal, due to both the plain text and original 
understanding of the U.N. Charter.159 The obey-or-be sanctioned standard 
leads to a different conclusion, however, and there is no clear guidance as to 
whether this should trump the treaty-based method for determining legality. 
D. The International Community and Responses to Terrorism 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter protects “the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense” once a state has been subject to an “armed attack,” at 
 
 155 See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 156–60 (discussing the “attitudinal gap” toward international human 
rights between the West and Russia and China in the context NATO’s Kosovo intervention). 
 156 Id. at 158. 
 157 Valerie J. Lofland, Somalia: U.S. Intervention and Operation Restore Hope, in CASE STUDIES IN 
POLICYMAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION 53, 54 (David A. Williams, ed. 6th ed. 2002), available at 
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/pmi/somalia1.pdf; Fernando R. Teson, Collective Humanitarian 
Intervention, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 323, 348–49 (1998). 
 158 Id. 
 159 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; see also FRANCK, supra note 141. 
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least until the Security Council has had the opportunity to address the issue.160 
Because the United Nations was formed in reaction to World War II, it is 
possible to conclude that “armed attack” originally referred to a case of state-
on-state violence.161 Unsurprisingly, events over the last few decades have led 
many scholars to argue that the rights granted under Article 51 are insufficient 
for purposes of modern self-defense against threats such as terrorism.162 Unlike 
the case of humanitarian intervention, however, there has been very little 
international condemnation of the principle of fighting terrorism and no 
evidence that the founders of the United Nations considered and rejected the 
idea that states should be able to respond to such threats. 
Between 1945 and 1991, the international community did not sanction 
states that took limited action in response to terrorist attacks.163 Examples 
include the United Kingdom’s attacks against Yemen in 1949 and 1957, the 
United States’ 1986 bombing of Libya, and several Israeli strikes against its 
Arab neighbors.164  
In more recent years, the practice of using force to respond to terrorism has 
only grown in acceptance. Only one day after the attacks of September 11, the 
Security Council passed a resolution that affirmed the right to respond in self-
defense, called terrorism “a threat to international peace and security,” and 
expressed the Council’s “readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of 
terrorism.”165 A few weeks later, it passed Resolution 1373, which called on all 
 
 160 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 161 See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 102–03 (“[I]t may be considered to 
be agreed that an armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces 
across an international border, but also ‘the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to 
amount to’ (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, ‘or its substantial involvement 
therein.’ This description, contained in Article 3, paragraph (g), of the Definition of Aggression annexed to 
General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), may be taken to reflect customary international law.”). 
 162 See, e.g., Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to Amend Article 
51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 25 (1987); Yoo, supra note 11, at 751–72. 
 163 WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 255, 257–58, 271–72, 292–300. 
 164 Id. On the other hand, when the supposed “terrorists” being attacked were fighting for self-
determination or the end of Western colonialism, the international community has reacted harshly towards the 
aggressor state. See id. at 300–01. With the end of European domination of third-world countries, however, 
this deviation from the rule is only of historical interest. 
 165 S.C. Res. 1368, paras. 1, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). 
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states to take proactive steps to suppress terrorist activity.166 By May 2002, a 
coalition of states was occupying Afghanistan and approximately half of the 
14,000 foreign troops were non-Americans.167 
More than twenty countries have contributed troops to the Afghan War 
effort, and dozens more have provided support in the form of intelligence, 
logistics, equipment, or permission to fly over airspace.168 All this international 
backing came despite the fact that the United States invaded Afghanistan to 
overthrow its government, something that is normally illegal under the plain 
text of the U.N. Charter.169 A few scholars have argued that the invasion was 
not covered under Article 51 or explicitly authorized by the Security Council 
and hence illegal.170 But there has been virtually no international resistance to 
the American-led effort; pragmatism has triumphed over adherence to the plain 
text of the U.N. Charter.171 
In addition to invading and occupying Afghanistan, the United States has 
been using air drones to target and kill suspected terrorists in Somalia, Yemen, 
and Pakistan.172 Although this method of fighting terrorism has drawn 
criticism,173 the United States has not suffered any international sanctions as a 
result. Perhaps the worst that has happened is that American relations with 
Pakistan have become strained, which is unsurprising considering that its 
territory has been targeted.174 
 
 166 S.C. Res. 1373, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
 167 Ian S. Livingston & Michael O’Hanlon, Afghanistan Index: Also Including Selected Data on Pakistan, 
BROOKINGS INST., Figs. 1.1, 1.2, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/foreign%20policy/afghanistan 
%20index/index20120930.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2013). 
 168 DEP’T OF DEF., FACT SHEET: INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM 
(May 22, 2002), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/May2002/d20020523cu.pdf; Christopher L. 
Gadoury, Should the United States Officially Recognize the Taliban? The International Legal and Political 
Considerations, 23 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 385, 386 (2001). 
 169 It is also likely relevant that, because of its human rights record, only three states recognized the 
Taliban at the time of the 2001 invasion. Oliver Roy, The Taliban: A Strategic Tool for Pakistan, in PAKISTAN: 
NATIONALISM WITHOUT A NATION? 149, 156 (Christophe Jaffrelot ed., 2002). 
 170 See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 111–14. 
 171 See, e.g., Allen S. Weiner, The Use of Force and Contemporary Security Threats, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
415, 457 (2006). 
 172 See Declan Walsh, Major Review By Pakistan Calls for End to Drone Hits, N.Y. TIMES INT’L, Mar. 
21, 2012, at A8. 
 173 See, e.g., Sikander Ahmed Shah, War on Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation Enduring Freedom, and 
the Legality of U.S. Drone Attacks in Pakistan, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 77, 123–26 (2010). 
 174 See Walsh, supra note 172, at A8. 
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A cynic may argue that the only reason that the international community 
accepts wars fought in reaction to terrorist threats is because the war on terror 
has the backing of the United States. This theory that American hegemony 
drives international norms does not, however, explain why states have been 
vocal in opposing both American humanitarian interventions and the 2003 
invasion of Iraq,175 even if the other countries have not been powerful enough 
to actually sanction the United States. One may conclude that considerations of 
power preclude sanctions against the United States, but we should also reject 
the idea that America is powerful enough to force other states to cooperate 
with its endeavors or chill the speech of those who would otherwise be critical 
of its policies. 
Another reason to reject a strong version of the American power hypothesis 
is that countries less powerful than the United States have used force against 
other states in the name of fighting terrorism and not faced third-party 
sanctions. In the 1990s, after the international community had failed to leave 
behind a stable government in Somalia, much of the country came under the 
rule of Islamists.176 Concerned with how the situation would affect its own 
security interests, Ethiopia invaded its neighbor in December 2006.177 Ethiopia 
was able to quickly seize the capital Mogadishu, where it tried to prop up the 
internationally supported Transitional Federal Government.178 After a 
prolonged insurgency, Ethiopia withdrew its forces in early 2009 without 
leaving behind a functional government and with Islamists still exercising 
control over parts of Somalia.179 Shortly after the Ethiopian invasion, the 
Security Council called for an African Union peacekeeping force to help 
support the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia.180 After the 
deployment of African peacemakers, the United Nations generally stood on the 
sidelines, its officials promising to send a peacekeeping force once the 
situation stabilized.181 In October 2011, the United States and France provided 
 
 175 See Richard Falk, The World Speaks on Iraq, 62 GUILD PRAC. 91, 93 (2005). 
 176 Bronwyn Bruton, In the Quicksands of Somalia: Where Doing Less Helps More, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 79, 
82 (2009). 
 177 Mike Pflanz, Ethiopia Intervenes in Somali Civil War, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 26, 2006, at 6. 
 178 Bruton, supra note 176, at 84. 
 179 Id. at 85. 
 180 S.C. Res. 1744, ¶ 3–5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1744 (Feb. 20, 2007); Scott Baldauf & Alexis Okeowo, Can 
African Peacekeepers Tame Somalia?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 12, 2007, at 7. 
 181 Rob Crilly, U.N. Faces Calls for Action in Somalia, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 15, 2007, at 7. 
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military support as Somalia was invaded once again, this time by its neighbor 
Kenya.182 
Similar to the backing of the American-led invasion of Afghanistan, the 
international community has supported, at least implicitly, violations of 
Somalia’s sovereignty in the name of fighting terrorism.183 Likewise, in 2008, 
when Turkey determined that certain elements among the Kurdish population 
in northern Iraq were supporting terrorism against the state, it launched 
incursions into the area.184 These attacks were generally accepted and even 
aided by the United States, who was occupying Iraq and did little more than 
put diplomatic pressure on Turkey to quickly end the invasion.185 The 
government in Baghdad condemned the attack but did not try to resist or take 
any other action.186 
Modern terrorism is a novel threat to the international community. The 
U.N. founders could not have imagined attacks like those of September 11. At 
the same time, the Charter makes clear that states retained the right to self-
defense.187 This right was “inherent,” which implies that it could evolve to take 
account of developing norms and technologies in a way that other Charter 
provisions could not. Thus, room was left for the international community to 
respond to new threats that arguably make the old idea of imminence 
outdated.188 When an analysis of the text of Article 51 is combined with the 
fact that third-party states do not sanction countries that respond militarily to 
terrorist threats, and often even support them, it is clear that using proportional 
force against terrorists in other countries fits under the modern rubric of self-
defense. 
 
 182 A Big Gamble, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2011, at 60. France was directly reacting to one of its citizens 
having been kidnapped and killed by extremists in that country. Id. at 60–61. 
 183 See Jeffrey Gettleman, World Leaders Are Meeting in a Script All Too Familiar to Somalis, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 23, 2012, at A8. 
 184 Turkey Invades Northern Iraq, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 2008, at 51. 
 185 Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Mark Mazzetti, Gates Urges Turkey to End Its Iraq Invasion by Mid-March, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2008, at A10. 
 186 Id. Of course, Baghdad’s passivity may partly be explained by the weakness of the central government. 
As of 2008, the Iraqi state did not have well-functioning institutions and maintained little control over the 
Kurdish north of the country. 
 187 See U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 188 See John C. Yoo, Force Rules: U.N. Reform and Intervention, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 641, 649–54 (2006) 
(arguing for updating the imminence standard that applied at the founding of the U.N.). 
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The U.N. Charter explicitly rejects the idea that one state could use force to 
interfere in the internal affairs of another.189 But it affirms an inherent right to 
self-defense that had long-standing legitimacy amongst the members of the 
international community at the time of the U.N.’s founding.190 With the rise of 
concerns over radical Islamic extremism, the international community has 
become more explicit in its acceptance of and support for preemptive and 
retaliatory strikes against terrorist targets.191 By attacking a country that 
harbors and supports terrorists, a state directly neutralizes the target and deters 
similar action in the future. Even before the attacks of September 11, such uses 
of force against other states were widely accepted and never sanctioned.192 
E. The Grey Areas 
In determining the legality of different kinds of interstate uses of force, this 
article uses the obey-or-be sanctioned standard and the U.N. Charter as 
guideposts. The rules can be summed up as follows: 
1. Classic invasions are illegal.193  
2. Limited strikes against terrorist targets are legal.194  
3. Other uses of force, including humanitarian intervention, cannot be said 
to be legal or illegal. 
Relying on these rules, the third category, the “grey areas,” includes the use 
of interstate force in the following circumstances: 
A. Third-party states supporting third world insurgencies or intrastate 
struggles against colonial and apartheid governments are not sanctioned.195  
 
 189 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 190 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 191 See, e.g., Andrea Armstrong & W. Michael Reisman, The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive 
Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 525, 537–56 (2006). 
 192 See WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 255, 257–58, 271–72, 292–300. 
 193  These are wars in which one country’s soldiers or weapons cross the established borders of another to 
overthrow the government of the target state or seize its territory. This category does not include wars that are 
humanitarian interventions, continuations of previous conflicts, or can be interpreted as a major power using 
force to maintain a traditional sphere of influence. 
 194 There is a principal of proportionality: After a major attack like that of September 11, the United States 
received international support for overthrowing the Taliban. Usually, terrorist attacks kill fewer people and 
retaliations or preemptive actions are more restrained. 
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B. Third-party intervention in a civil war on one side or another is not 
sanctioned, provided that the intervention does not rise to the level of a classic 
invasion.196 
C. Major powers are not sanctioned for using force to maintain their 
spheres of influence.197 
D. The instigators of “neo-colonial” wars are not sanctioned.198 
E. There is no consistent pattern of sanctions regarding the use of force in 
“post-imperial” wars.199 
F. There are generally no sanctions for aggressors in situations where the 
attack can be seen as the continuation of a previous conflict that was left 
unsettled.200  
F. The General Pattern 
 International law scholars who decry the failure of international law to 
restrain the interstate use of force point to the absolute numbers of armed 
conflicts in the world and cases of countries violating the text of the U.N. 
Charter with impunity.201 The list above appears to show that these critics have 
a point.202 The initiation of interstate humanitarian interventions or wars that fit 
 
 195 Between 1945 and 1991, European or European-derived people used interstate force to maintain 
colonies or apartheid governments in fifteen conflicts. Id. at 63–96. In each situation, the non-European side 
received significant support from third-parties, who were never sanctioned. Id. With the end of European 
colonialism and apartheid, this rule has lost any contemporary significance. 
 196 See id. at 170–208. 
 197 This includes when the United States invaded Grenada or when the Soviet Union put down the 
rebellion in Czechoslovakia. Id. at 219–42. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, however, it was 
attacking a state that was not traditionally under its control and therefore sanctioned. Id. at 44–46. 
 198 These are instances in which third world states have sought to achieve authority over areas not 
recognized as states when the wars began. Id. at 243. Two conflicts that fit into this category are Morocco’s 
attempts over the decades to subdue Western Sahara and Indonesia’s 1975–83 invasion of East Timor. Id. at 
244–51. 
 199 Id. at 97–118. These are invasions in the immediate aftermath of imperial dissolution, involving the 
crossing of borders that lack long-term international acceptance. Id. at 97. 
 200 Id. at 119–69. In particular, the world has shown a “general acquiescence toward Arab-Israeli 
violence.” Id. at 165–66. As in all uses of force that do not draw sanctions, this is not to say that different 
combatants have not faced criticism. Israel, for example, is often condemned for its behavior, See, e.g., id. at 
138. But third-party states never incur the costs of meting out serious punishment. 
 201 See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. 
 202 See supra Part I.E. 
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into the six other kinds of grey areas above arguably violate the U.N. Charter 
since, in the vast majority of cases, the aggressor cannot be said to be acting in 
self-defense or with Security Council approval. If the existence of a coherent 
doctrine of international law regarding the use of force requires the relevant 
rules to be written down in a treaty and violators to always be punished, then 
those who say there is no such law are correct. Further, if all armed conflict, 
except attacks authorized by the Security Council or justified on the grounds of 
self-defense, must be eliminated in order to say that international rules 
regarding the use of force exist, then once again the critics of the current 
system have it right. 
Such criticisms set standards that are too high and go beyond even what the 
U.N. founders hoped to accomplish.203 If international law is conceived as a set 
of norms that bring sanctions when violated and deter the undesirable acts, 
then the conclusion follows that classic invasions, at the very least, are illegal. 
Importantly, this reflects a more general pattern. It shows that international law 
is biased towards preserving the status quo.204 A classic invasion upsets the 
current order and is thus likely to be sanctioned.205 On the other hand, in the 
case of interfering in a civil war or reinitiating hostilities in the midst of an 
ongoing dispute, there is no stable status quo to disrupt. The legality of 
superpowers maintaining their traditional spheres of influence through wars 
that would otherwise be classified as classic invasions also makes sense in this 
context. International terrorism promotes destruction and instability and, 
therefore, limited strikes to deal with the problem are not sanctioned but rather 
treated as legal uses of force. The major exception to the status quo bias of the 
law regarding the interstate use of force since World War II has been cases 
where third-parties support non-Europeans fighting to overthrow Western 
powers or achieve equality with European-derived people, as in the case of the 
international condemnation of the white regime in South Africa and the 
sanctions put on the country for attacking anti-apartheid activists in 
neighboring states.206 With the end of colonialism and legalized European 
privilege, however, this anomaly of international law has become irrelevant. 
 
 203 See supra notes 88–94 and accompanying text. 
 204 For an earlier version of this argument, see WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 310–13. 
 205 Id. at 313. 
 206 Id. 
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Even the international reactions to the four classic invasions between 1945 
and 1991 that did not result in meaningful sanctions against the aggressor 
support the theory of the status quo bias or can be explained by other rules of 
international law. Iraq was not sanctioned for its invasion of Iran, and Tanzania 
faced no significant consequences for its attack against Uganda.207 In both 
situations, however, the target regime was itself a threat to international 
stability.208 Self-determination, the same principle that legitimized struggles 
against European colonialism and apartheid, explains the arguable legality of 
Indonesia’s annexation of West Irian and India’s seizure of Goa.209 
The analysis of humanitarian interventions and the international reactions 
to them shows that they generally fit into the same pattern that other wars do. 
Wars that preserve the status quo are more acceptable than both wars that 
disrupt the status quo and wars that involve intervention in a situation where 
there is little stability to begin with.210 Although Western countries sometimes 
allow humanitarian concerns to overrule other important considerations, other 
states like Russia and China tend to prefer maintaining international 
stability.211 Somalia had no functioning government when the United Nations 
intervened to deliver food aid;212 there was no way that the international 
community could preserve a status quo that did not exist. Yugoslavia was in 
the process of disintegrating when NATO attacked, but it was still a 
universally recognized state.213 Therefore, the Kosovo intervention was greatly 
resisted by much of the world.214 Finally, the African Union, Arab League, 
China, and Russia were willing to support a no-fly zone over Libya that would 
prevent Muammar Gadaffi from killing large numbers of civilians.215 As soon 
as it became clear that NATO was trying to overthrow the government of an 
established state, however, the war came to look more like a classic invasion 
 
 207 Id. at 40–42, 47–52. 
 208 Id. at 60–61. 
 209 Id. at 59–60. 
 210 Id. at 311. 
 211 See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 156–59. 
 212 See Jeffrey Gettleman & Neil MacFarquhar, Somalia Food Aid Bypasses Needy, U.N. Study Says, N.Y. 
TIMES, March 7, 2010, at A1. 
 213  Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Rejects Demand for Cessation of Use of Force 
Against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, U.N. Press Release SC/6659 (Mar. 26, 1999). 
 214 Id. 
 215 Arab States Back Libya No-Fly Zone Against Gaddafi, REUTERS, (Mar. 12, 2011), http://www.reuters. 
com/article/2011/03/12/us-libya-idUSTRE7270JP20110312; see also S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1973 
(Mar. 17, 2011). 
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and the international community soured on the attack.216 The leading states of 
NATO may be too powerful to suffer economic sanctions or military invasion 
as a result of the international community’s anger, but expanding the mission 
in Libya has made it harder for the United States and its allies to effectively 
pressure the al-Assad regime in Syria to give up the struggle against its own 
domestic uprising and may have other future consequences.217 
Finally, understanding the status quo bias sheds light on the territorial 
integrity norm. For what can be more destabilizing to the international 
community than a redrawing of accepted borders? Throughout history, 
territorial disputes have been the main cause of war.218 If the international 
community regards well-established borders as inviolable and states are 
sanctioned for trying to annex territory, then even countries predisposed to go 
to war will have much less to fight about. The result has been the end of 
territory wars and the near-elimination of states using their militaries to 
overthrow other sovereign governments.219 
G. Should We Thank (or Blame) International Law? 
There are several reasons why territorial aggression and classic invasions 
may have become less common, some of which have nothing to do with 
international law. First, over time, land has become less valuable relative to 
“human capital,” thus reducing the incentives to make war to seize territory.220 
Second, the bipolar world during the Cold War was important for maintaining 
international stability.221 Third, the spread of democracy can also be 
credited.222 These theories may be partly correct. However, these material or 
structural explanations of the status quo bias fail to do fully describe the 
decrease in war for several reasons. The international reaction to classic 
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invasions indicates that there are severe sanctions for states that use force to 
seize land or overthrow other governments.223 In domestic law, if an act is 
prohibited by law with severe sanctions against those who violate the rule, then 
many would agree with the presumption that the sanctions are at least partly 
responsible for the undesirable act’s infrequent occurrence.224 Supporting this 
position is the fact that since the end of the Cold War, the European Union, the 
United States, and the United Nations have all become much more willing to 
use sanctions to deal with human rights violations, nuclear proliferation, and 
other international problems.225 This indicates that today the international 
community would be at least as willing as it has been in the past to take 
meaningful steps in response to interstate aggression. 
There are several reasons why explanations of the status quo bias of 
international law that ignore norms are inadequate. First, while it may be true 
that land has become less important in determining national wealth, with 
ownership of tangible resources, particularly oil, land can still make the 
difference between a country being rich or poor. From 1988 to 1996, eleven 
states had oil exports that had a total value that was higher than one quarter of 
their entire GDP.226 In the same time period, no less than seventeen states had 
oil exports that were valued at over ten percent of GDP, and six states had 
exported non-fuel minerals that were valued at least ten percent of GDP.227 
Also, since 1996 the price of oil has skyrocketed. Between 2000 and 2002, oil 
was selling for between $17 and $40 a barrel.228 From the end of 2010 to the 
summer of 2012, it was fluctuating between $68 and $110 a barrel.229 Thus, it 
is possible that some states have become even more dependent on oil for their 
wealth over the last decade. 
Second, the theory that the bipolar world is responsible for the international 
stability of the modern era also fails as a full explanation. Since the collapse of 
the Berlin Wall, the status quo bias has continued to be as much of a factor as 
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it was before in international law, and the disappearance of the Soviet Union 
has not led to an upsurge of classic invasions. In fact, while the number of 
interstate wars did see a slight jump after 1991, the total number of people 
killed per interstate war has plummeted, meaning fewer overall deaths.230 
Some have argued that it is actually a unipolar world that leads to stability and 
credit American hegemony for international peace.231 But the norms favoring 
territorial integrity and prohibiting classic invasions have persisted both during 
and after the Cold War. This indicates that the international stability of the 
modern era depends less on whether the world is unipolar or bipolar than it 
does on other factors. Multipolarity, however, with three or more poles, has not 
existed since at least 1945 and may be a system less conducive to peace. 
Finally, there are problems with using the democratic peace theory to 
explain the status quo bias of international law. In recent decades, the 
territorial integrity norm has applied to dictatorial regimes as well as 
democratic states, with no country having successfully annexed another’s 
territory since 1976.232 In the last thirty-eight years, the rule has been observed 
everywhere despite the presence of dictatorial regimes. The territorial integrity 
norm is not exclusively observed between democracies or between 
democracies and dictatorships. Non-democracies have followed the same norm 
for nearly four decades usually without undertaking classic invasions against 
one another. 
While a few countries in the world like South Korea and Japan have 
become wealthy mostly due to human capital, others like Qatar and Kuwait 
have achieved a high standard of living by simply residing over a sea of oil. If 
countries mostly sought security and power, then it seems it would make sense 
to seize another state’s territory and profit off of its oil or other resources. Yet 
arguably, the only national leader in the Middle East who has acted in a 
manner consistent with the theory of states as self-interested actors has been 
Saddam Hussein, and both he and his country suffered dire consequences as a 
result.233 Even if it is not logical to invade other countries to seize their 
resources, leaders do not have perfect information. In a Hobbesian system with 
asymmetric information and cognitive biases, at least some countries should be 
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expected to weigh their options and come to the conclusion that a classic 
invasion makes sense in a particular instance. The fact that no state does 
indicates either that moral scruples on the part of leaders prevent them from 
attacking other countries or that the international sanctions that come when one 
launches a classic invasion are deterring such actions. 
One could potentially argue against the obey-or-be sanctioned standard by 
the saying that the behavior we observe simply shows states acting in their own 
interests.234 State A might not invade the smaller state B because state C, the 
largest state of all, has an interest in stopping state A.235 The rules of 
international law will only be followed if they are consistent with an 
equilibrium resulting from a system of international actors pursuing their own 
interests, because there is no third-party enforcer.236 As soon as circumstances 
change, states will not hesitate to violate the norms they once supported. 
The universality of the territorial integrity norm indicates that there is more 
going on than states simply trying to maximize wealth, security, and power.237 
It has been more than three and a half decades since a state has successfully 
seized the territory of another. In all that time, it seems quite implausible to 
believe that the world’s more powerful states have never seen a single instance 
where it was in their interest to support one state’s takeover of a part of 
another. A critic of international law may point out that stability itself is what 
powerful states might seek; therefore, the long term benefits of upholding the 
norm against classic invasions might outweigh the short-term benefits of 
supporting its violation in any particular instance.238 
This theory of enforcement, however, is not an alternative to international 
law but rather another way of describing it. If it were shown that the police or a 
state’s leader only enforced the law for self-interested reasons, that would be 
no reason to argue that domestic law did not exist. The more relevant question 
is whether enforcers of the law consistently punish certain actions and 
therefore deter what are considered crimes. Since classic invasions are 
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consistently punished, it follows from both the U.N. Charter and the actual 
state practice that these kinds of wars are illegal. 
Perhaps the reason that international law is not given more credit for the 
decline in interstate war is because the victory over classic invasions and 
territorial aggrandizement has been so complete. In 1990, after the 
international community succeeded in expelling Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, 
there was a burst of optimism that, with the end of the Cold War, a “new world 
order” had arrived that would finally provide collective security.239 Had a large 
number of classic invasions occurred since, perhaps the collective response 
would have been the same each time and more people would be optimistic 
about the enforcement of contemporary norms relating to the use of force and 
territorial integrity. But because this has not happened, and wars for territory 
have been eliminated, it is very easy to take what has been accomplished for 
granted. It is hard to believe that even the most optimistic global legalist alive 
in 1945 actually thought that Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter was to be taken 
literally. Similarly, the collective effort to eliminate interstate conflict should 
be judged by more modest standards than one that demands the elimination of 
all war, at least in the short term. 
If the decline of interstate conflict is based on factors unrelated to 
international law, perhaps there is little risk in tweaking the U.N. Charter or 
introducing new ways to deal with the domestic use of force by states. But 
before accepting the need for or desirability of reform, the current doctrine of 
international law regarding the use of force must be acknowledged. That 
doctrine may very well be responsible for the elimination of the kinds of 
conflicts that originally motivated the study of international law and the 
formation of the United Nations. In the postwar era, classic invasions have 
been met with severe sanctions, and a territorial integrity norm has been 
established and maintained.240 This indicates that among states, there is a 
normative bias in favor of the status quo, and states are willing to act to 
enforce this preference. Only by understanding the world community’s 
reactions to past instances of interstate uses of force can we have more 
informed discussions on the desirability of potential changes to the current 
international order. 
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II. WHAT DETERMINES WHICH NORMS ARE EFFECTIVE 
This Part presents a more general theory of how a global norm can become 
an effective part of international law. Having argued against material 
explanations for the status quo bias of international law, the broader issues 
surrounding global norms are examined here, including the questions of when 
they are adhered to and why. First, no norm can exist without a “norm 
entrepreneur,” which is often a powerful individual or group of sovereign 
states that accepts the rule and pushes the rest of the world to accept it. Once 
the norm has been created, whether it survives depends on its specificity and 
how inherently morally compelling it is. When a norm gains a high enough 
degree of legitimacy, its violation becomes unthinkable for most state actors. 
The world community punishes rule-breakers, and the norm thus meets the 
obey-or-be sanctioned standard of international law. Over time, not acting in 
conformance with the rule becomes even more unthinkable. Even if states are 
self-interested actors, if they behave as people do in the real world, they are not 
completely rational agents seeking their own good. They are shaped by norms 
and a desire to live up to standards of appropriateness; this Article argues that 
at the very least, world leaders are subject to the same influences that affect 
individuals. 
The model presented explains why some norms take hold and some do not. 
Three historical examples are chosen as illustrations of the larger point: the 
decline of slavery, the end of colonization, and the campaign to establish a 
guaranteed minimum standard of living under international law. The goal is to 
avoid biasing the analysis by only discussing norms that took hold. While 
slavery is universally condemned and rarely practiced and colonization is 
similarly unthinkable, there is still no global consensus on issues regarding 
wealth redistribution. While just about every state able to do so provides some 
kind of social safety net, states do not try to force other countries to accept 
expansive welfare states, and in domestic politics, no one relies on 
international law to make the case for redistributionist policies. Examining the 
norms that have succeeded shows that materialistic accounts are incapable of 
explaining the creation and maintenance of the rules banning slavery and 
colonization. 
Finally, a similar analysis is conducted regarding the two main legs of the 
status quo bias of international law: the territorial integrity norm and the ban 
on classic invasions. These norms have succeeded while others have failed 
because of the path-dependent course of international law and the fact that 
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these norms are clear and morally compelling. The moral correctness of the 
ban on classic invasions can be quibbled with despite the ban’s effectiveness. 
The parameters of this rule are also uncertain. The territorial integrity norm 
works even better as an effective rule of international law and, consistent with 
the theory presented, has even more influence on state behavior. 
A. Why Do Some Norms Succeed? 
International norms have been defined as rules of state practice that are 
followed out of a sense of “oughtness” or because the rules are legitimized in 
the minds of relevant actors.241 This is similar to the concept of customary 
international law, with its corresponding requirements of state practice and 
opinio juris.242 To realist scholars, norms are about power; states follow them 
when convenient and then adjust their behavior as the international situation 
changes.243 For example, powerful states have always forced weaker ones to 
protect certain minorities out of ideational concerns.244 However, it is argued 
that those who believe that international law can trump national interests have 
failed to show that there is a mechanism that makes leaders follow the 
unenforceable rules of the world community.245 
Some international relations scholars, in contrast, believe that norms 
occasionally have explanatory power in and of themselves.246 A few of these 
scholars have tried to explain why some norms become prominent and others 
do not, and why leaders would follow rules of the international system when 
doing so harms the national interest. For example, Ann Florini makes an 
analogy between the success or failure of a norm in the international system 
and the fate of a genetic trait in a biological population.247 Three factors 
determine whether a variation of a gene proliferates, goes extinct, or coexists 
with other alleles in a state of equilibrium—these factors are what she calls 
prominence, coherence, and environment.248 Prominence means that the gene 
must first establish a “foothold” in the population. The mutation must arise and 
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have a chance for success.249 A bird born with unusually sharp vision will not 
have the chance to pass on its advantageous trait if it is killed soon after being 
born. Coherence depends on the other genes carried by an organism.250 One 
needs both sharp teeth and a suitable digestive system to eat meat; one trait 
without the other is much less useful. The environment is everything external 
to the actor, and the factor that is usually most heavily emphasized in accounts 
of natural selection.251 
All three factors have their equivalents in the study of the survival of 
norms. A rule must first become prominent due to the efforts of a “norm 
entrepreneur,” which can be a powerful state or nongovernmental 
organizations.252 Once established, for a new norm to survive, it must be 
coherent with older rules.253 If it contradicts other practices widely accepted by 
the international community, the norm is less likely to succeed. Finally, the 
“environment” the international norm finds itself in depends on everything that 
goes on in the global system.254 This includes the international balance of 
power and technological developments over time. 
Vaughn Shannon presents a slightly different model, which takes norms as 
a given and tries to explain why a state would follow an unenforceable rule 
when it conflicts with the national interest.255 He points to important findings 
from political psychology that can shed light on compliance. Perhaps the most 
important of these is that people, presumably including world leaders, try to 
maintain positive self-images and gain approval and esteem from their peers.256 
The need for a positive self-image “has been characterized as being among the 
strongest and most persistent of human goals” and has been shown to exist 
even “in the absence of external sanctioning agents.”257 The need to be 
accepted by peers means that individuals are prone to making use of the 
acceptability heuristic, which is a finding that people are biased towards acting 
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in ways that their relevant social community considers acceptable.258 This 
means that a president or prime minister does not exist in a vacuum. The leader 
is rather a social being with psychological needs, belonging to a certain 
“identity group” whose approval he seeks.259 What is considered normal or 
acceptable exerts a normative pull on his psyche that sometimes comes into 
conflict with more easily quantifiable economic desires. Today, it is reasonable 
to believe that world leaders see elites of other states as part of their peer 
group.260 
Shannon, like other constructivist scholars, also makes use of the 
psychological concept of the omission bias, which teaches that people prefer 
acting in accordance with the status quo, all else being equal.261 The presence 
of the omission bias is ubiquitous in the creation of legal systems. For 
example, pharmaceutical companies are punished for harmful effects of 
vaccinations but not for failing to create vaccines.262 Many jurisdictions 
similarly impose no duty to help even when the costs of doing so are greatly 
outweighed by the harm prevented.263 People are often hesitant to pull the plug 
on life-saving medical care even if they would decline to initiate such care 
under identical circumstances.264 Due to the omission bias, a norm created by 
powerful states might occasionally be expected to stick, even if there is nothing 
inherently compelling about it. 
Shannon’s model of compliance—relying on the acceptability heuristic, the 
omission bias, and the fact that leaders seek approval from themselves and 
others—takes conformance with the rules of the international community as 
the norm.265 From the perspective of political psychology, the question is not 
“why do states obey international law?” but “why do states break well 
accepted rules?” 
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For the issue of whether to comply to come up, there must first be a 
conflict between traditional interests and adherence to the rule in question. If 
there is, then we ask how interpretable, or “fuzzy,” the norm is. If the rule is 
extremely clear—everyone agrees it is wrong to do X and what constitutes X is 
not in dispute, particularly in this situation—then violation becomes very 
difficult. On the other hand, if a particular situation arguably fits into an 
exception, then the actor may be able to justify violating the norm in question 
to himself and his peers. Finally, even if the situation clearly does not fall into 
an exception to the rule, if incentives to violate are high enough and the state 
can get away with breaking the rule through covert means, a leader may still 
act in opposition to the norm. 
Behavioral research has confirmed the importance of both the “fuzziness” 
of a rule and maintaining a positive self-image in our daily lives.266 Most 
people like to think of themselves as honest, regardless of whether anyone else 
is looking.267 In summing up a series of experiments where individuals had the 
opportunity to cheat others while believing that no one would find out, 
Jonathan Haidt explained: “People [did not] try to get away with as much as 
they could. Rather . . . they cheated only up to the point where they themselves 
could no longer find a justification that would preserve their belief in their own 
honesty.”268 In one case, students participated in an experiment in which they 
were told that they had earned $6.25.269 When they went to receive their 
payment, the cashier purposefully made a mistake by giving them two extra 
dollars.270 Some students were simply given the extra money, but in a different 
run of the experiment, the cashier asked, “Is that right?” after counting the 
cash.271 The prompt made all the difference. In the baseline experiment of 120 
students, only twenty students pointed out the mistake compared to sixty who 
did so when asked if they had received the correct amount.272 
Other studies also support the view that human beings are neither 
completely honest nor ruthless self-interest maximizers. In one experiment, 
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subjects were given a fifty question multiple-choice exam and were told that 
they would be awarded ten cents for every correct answer.273 After answering 
the questions, a control group transferred their answers to a blank scoring 
sheet.274 The control group answered an average of 32.6 questions correctly.275 
Another group of students transferred their answers to a scoring sheet with the 
correct answers already marked.276 This group claimed to have answered, on 
average, 36.2 questions correctly.277 Interestingly, they did not act as rational 
choice actors and report no errors, but simply chose to give themselves a small 
bump.278 This was not due to the students being afraid of getting caught, 
because it made no difference in reporting their scores on whether they could 
shred their answer sheets after the experiment.279 It can easily be seen how the 
participants could have believed that they were acting honestly while also, 
giving themselves the benefit of the doubt in ambiguous cases. 
This supports the idea that states would have a preference for behaving in 
accordance with widely accepted norms, even if leaders only had to answer to 
their own consciences. Yet, some norm violations, such as invading another 
state, occur in clear view of the rest of the world. The aggressor suffers 
psychological disutility from knowing that it behaved inappropriately and also 
from reputational damage. Even when no one is watching, people only behave 
dishonestly to the extent to which one can maintain a positive self-image. 
When reputation comes into play, the incentives for behaving in accordance 
with widely-accepted norms are even stronger. 
Florini and Shannon are asking two separate but related questions. Florini’s 
evolutionary analogy seeks to help us predict whether a norm will become 
universal, die out, or like certain genes, come to exist in a state of equilibrium 
with some states acting in conformance and others behaving in a contrary 
manner.280 Shannon’s model works on a case-by-case basis. Instead of asking 
whether the norm will succeed, it takes the norm as given and addresses the 
question of “is state X likely to conform with the norm in this particular 
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instance?”281 The two inquiries are similar because the survival of a norm 
depends on whether states behave in accordance with it.282 If they ignore the 
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Instead of taking norms as a given, the model presented here explains both 
their origins and how much each particular rule can be expected to influence 
state behavior in individual circumstances. Much of the work is done by 
determining a norm’s “robustness.” If a norm has the inherent qualities that 
make it likely to influence state behavior in particular circumstances, it can, 
from an ex ante perspective, be expected to “stick.” Over time, if the norm is 
followed often enough, it becomes more and more legitimized in the minds of 
the actors of the world community. 
In the model presented, a rule is established through the actions of a norm 
entrepreneur. Many norms owe their existence to a powerful state—or 
sometimes a coalition of states—coming to believe that it has an interest in 
encouraging or suppressing a certain kind of activity. The worldwide abolition 
of the slave trade by the British is a prominent example.283 Similarly, after each 
world war, the United States played a unique role in shaping the League of 
Nations and the United Nations.284 In the modern era, much of what can be 
called norm creation has originated with NGOs and international 
institutions.285 Regardless, the degree to which a new rule gains a “footing” 
among the world community depends to a large extent on the power of the 
initial norm entrepreneur and its zeal in enforcing the standard it sets.286 NGOs 
and multi-national corporations are generally less likely than strong states to 
create effective norms. 
The reasons the original actor has for enforcing a norm may be economic, 
ideational, or some combination of both. The power of the norm entrepreneur 
and how committed it is to the new international rule will affect the likelihood 
that the norm sticks. A state may be anti-slavery but do little to stem the 
practice or, like the British in the nineteenth century, it can actively suppress 
it.287 The United States cared enough about world peace after World War II to 
push for the U.N. Charter, which became the authoritative legal text on the 
interstate use of force.288 Article 2(4) and related provisions became Schelling 
Points around which all future discussions of war and peace would be 
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focused.289 Thus, a certain path-dependency was created regarding 
international law and the use of force after World War II. 
After a norm has been created, two factors will influence its potential for 
affecting the consciences of world leaders and mass publics and becoming a 
point around which coalesce future discussion and thinking regarding the 
issues the rule pertains to. First, the more specific a norm is, the more likely it 
is to be effective.290 This depends on how precisely the norm is defined and, 
relatedly, how well it is understood.291 How many “exceptions” are there to the 
rule, and how much time can countries spend debating whether the exception 
applies in any individual case? Can a leader violate the norm and still be able 
to convince the world community that he was actually behaving in a way 
appropriate for a modern statesman? Once the relevant borders have been 
established for a long period of time, the concept of the ban on aggressive war 
is ambiguous in a way that the territorial integrity norm is not.292 
Second, a norm will be more effective the more morally compelling it is. 
The most cursory examination of world cultures would seem to cast doubt on 
the proposition that there can be universal moral precepts that the entire world 
can agree.293 Anthropologists who have taken a closer look, however, have 
found many societal traits, including certain moral ideas about right and 
wrong, to be universal across cultures.294 In the modern era, there is a world 
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consensus on a handful of moral debates. Few today defend slavery, piracy, or 
racial apartheid.295 
Constructivists have emphasized that “cosmopolitan” values have a 
competitive edge in the market place of ideas.296 And once individuals assent 
to a principle such as self-determination or human equality, then other 
positions logically follow. This is consistent with the concept of “coherence,” 
which precludes norms that blatantly contradict one another.297  
Philosopher Peter Singer writes of the “escalator of reason” and how it 
provides a mechanism through which humans who share only their ability to 
think logically can arrive at common ideas about morality 298 Human beings 
evolved intelligence to help us survive, find mates, and reproduce, not to be 
moral.299 Yet the interesting thing about the tool of reason is that it can take us 
places we did not expect to go. Singer tells the story of Thomas Hobbes one 
day glancing at the Forty-seventh Theorem of Euclid’s The Elements of 
Geometry.300 Hobbes found what he read impossible to believe, until he 
examined the entire chain of reasoning and was unable to dispute a single 
point.301 Singer argues that the process of thinking about moral issues works in 
the same way. 
[B]y thinking about my place in the world, I am able to see that I am 
just one being among others, with interests and desires like others. I 
have a personal perspective on the world, from which my interests 
are at the front and centre of the stage, the interests of my family and 
friends are close behind, and the interests of strangers are pushed to 
the back and sides. But reason enables me to see that others have 
similarly subjective perspectives, and that from ‘the point of view of 
the universe’ my perspective is no more privileged than theirs.302 
In fact, realists do not deny the effect of morality on human behavior. For 
national leaders to act in the interests of their country in the first place, they 
must not behave as self-interested agents in the public choice sense. Instead, a 
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certain amount of altruism towards their fellow co-nationals is required.303 
Thus, to a certain extent constructivists and realists only disagree about which 
moral code leaders adopt. There is no self-evident reason why we should begin 
with a model that says states act in their national interests. This Part argues that 
different moral considerations explain the effectiveness of international norms.  
Many constructivists do not simply assume that world leaders are equally 
likely to hold all plausible normative preferences but go a step further. They 
often follow realists in adopting the states-as-rational actors model to 
formulate a null hypothesis.304 From there, they only consider nonrealist 
explanations after showing that national interests as traditionally conceived 
cannot explain certain changes in the external behavior of a state.305 As we will 
see, certain case studies have persuasively shown that—at least when 
discussing Western states—some of the biggest changes of the last few 
centuries in how countries interact with one another cannot be explained by 
considerations of power, economic interest, or national security. Ideational 
concerns about right and wrong have mattered greatly.306 
There is some relation between the path-dependency requirement and the 
degree of specificity and inherent moral appeal of a norm. A norm might 
become popular in a powerful state because of its moral coherence. This state 
and its allies begin forming international institutions that aspire to propagate 
and enforce the norm, and the rest of the world community accepts it partly for 
the same reasons it initially became a successful cause in the original country. 
This is what happened in the case of slavery; abolitionists within Great Britain 
opposed the practice, and the greater public eventually compelled the 
government to make abolition a goal of its foreign policy.307 Britain at first had 
to use force to implement this preference, but after a long enough time, 
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practically every state agreed that slavery was wrong.308 Similarly, after the 
Union won the American Civil War, slavery’s legal status was settled in the 
United States.309 
The danger of constructing theories based on moral appeal is that such 
theories may simply assume that whatever the current culture believes in is the 
morally correct position. Many Westerners might feel very strongly that gays 
have a right to marry or that there must be a minimum wage. Yet people of 
intelligence and good faith can disagree with these positions for very coherent 
reasons. Few would say the same about the view that invading a neighboring 
state and enslaving its population is immoral. Thus, a cause that has low 
“inherent moral appeal” is simply a position regarding which, relative to other 
norms examined in this Part, there is much more room for debate. Therefore, 
the right to a decent standard of living, government-mandated restrictions on 
the working day, and the right to unionize can be said to have low moral 
appeal.310 This is because opposite positions can be taken on natural law or 
utilitarian grounds.311 
If a norm is widely followed because it is specific and morally compelling, 
then more and more states will fall into line. The process is dynamic; the less 
often the rule is broken, the more marked are violations. At this point, when a 
state is tempted to violate the norm, it not only must overcome the desire to 
conform with a rule that has inherent normative pull. It also must deal with the 
fact that the norm has been legitimized by the behavior of much of the rest of 
the international community. 
Finally, the model presented here explains not only why norms are 
followed, but how the international community can overcome the collective 
action problem of punishing those that violate the rule. Perhaps not all leaders 
can be expected to internalize the rules of international law such as the ban on 
classic invasions. And while reciprocity works in a model with two agents 
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repeatedly trying to overcome a collective action problem, game theory 
instructs that in larger groups it is usually not in an individual’s interest to be 
the one who sanctions those who violate norms.312 A punisher incurs the costs 
of sanctioning another individual yet only receives a fraction of the benefit.313 
A rational-choice agent should therefore hope that someone else punishes a 
cheater or slacker so the agent can receive the benefits of the deterrent effect 
through free-riding. 
Contrary to theory, however, people do punish cheaters, or those they see 
as behaving unfairly. Punishment itself is not inconsistent with rationalism, as 
rational choice models would predict that people would be inclined to sanction 
others when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs for the punisher. But 
individuals go further than that, punishing when there is nothing to gain, and 
even when they must pay to do so.314 For instance, in one oft-repeated 
experiment, one of two participants is given a certain amount of money and 
instructed to offer a portion of it to his partner.315 If the partner accepts, the 
transaction goes through, while if the offer is rejected, neither player receives 
anything.316 A rationalist account would expect the first player to make the 
smallest offer possible, and the second to accept it. The recipient knows that 
something is better than nothing, and the allocator should know that the 
recipient knows that something is better than nothing. In fact, in the original 
experiment, the first party on average offered the second party over thirty 
percent of the total pot.317 Recipients did not accept any nonzero sum but 
instead rejected nearly a quarter of all offers.318 They were willing to give up a 
small reward so that the party that angered them would be forced to forgo a 
larger prize. 
In another experiment, each of four players on a team was given twenty 
tokens worth about ten cents each.319 The players were then told that they 
could choose how much to put into a common pot.320 The number of tokens 
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put into the pot was then multiplied by 1.6, and the new total was divided 
between the players.321 In the next round, the teams were scrambled so that no 
norms of cooperation could develop within groups.322 The rational strategy 
then was to never contribute anything and hope that all the other players had 
contributed a lot. People, however, began the game by contributing an average 
of about ten tokens.323 But after six rounds, the more generous players had 
tired of being burned, and participants were only contributing six tokens 
each.324 
At that point players were told that the experiment would continue as 
before, with only one change.325 After learning how much each partner put into 
the common pool, they would have the option of punishing those who did not 
contribute their fair share.326 For every one token a player who was willing to 
pay, three would be taken away from the cheater.327 Over the course of the 
experiment, eighty-four percent of players chose to punish someone at least 
once, and as a result, cooperation skyrocketed.328 Players were contributing 
fifteen tokens each by the twelfth round.329 For a rational actor, the new 
conditions should not have made a difference. If I punish a cheater, that may 
make him think twice about not contributing his fair share in the next round. 
But that does me little good because the experiment was designed so that I 
could expect to be playing with different agents from then on. The purely 
rational strategy stayed the same throughout the game: contribute nothing and 
do not punish. These experiments are not anomalies, as it has been shown time 
and time again in laboratory settings that people sanction others “even when 
interactions are anonymous, there are no reputation effects, and the punisher is 
a third-party who is unaffected by the free rider’s actions.”330 
Like the experiments showing limited cheating with plausible deniability, 
this research supports models that emphasize the importance of a positive self-
image. Most players began by trying to pull their fair share, instead of 
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exclusively looking out for their own self-interest. This indicates that even if 
world leaders could flout international law without consequences, and even if 
they identified the national interest with their own, they may still incur costs in 
order to conform with international norms. But carrying out a classic invasion 
that clearly violates international law is something that happens transparently. 
The norm violator declares its intentions to the world. Not only are there 
negative reputational affects resulting from the aggression, but in enforcing 
international law other states may be rewarded by reputational gains. If people 
will sanction cheaters at a cost even when no one else can possibly know, it 
follows that they are even more likely to do so, and less likely to cheat 
themselves, when everyone is watching. If circumstances and the inherent 
properties of the norm allow for it, a point comes when adherence to the rule is 
nearly universal and violators are almost always punished. At this point, the 
rule meets the obey-or-be sanctioned standard and can be considered part of 
international law. 
Rule violators may also be punished because when a state has behaved in a 
way universally recognized as inappropriate, leaders of powerful states may be 
better able to justify breaking the rule against classic invasions in attacking the 
aggressor. Shannon points out that one may violate a norm against a group of 
people when the “[t]argets are ‘exempt’ from moral consideration because they 
are perceived to have directly threatened or injured the subject (self-defense) or 
because they lie outside normative parameters by virtue of their status as a 
socially unacceptable group (e.g., ‘terrorists’) . . . .”331 In other words, when a 
state violates a well established norm, it may come to be seen as outside of the 
group to which one applies the normal rules of international relations. At the 
extreme, the outsider may invoke feelings of hatred and disgust.332 This 
demonization, combined with the natural human urge to punish violators of 
accepted norms, leads states to incur costs to sanction those who behave in 
ways widely considered unacceptable. 
This process is dynamic. The norm becoming part of international law 
under the obey-or-be sanctioned standard increases its legitimacy. At a certain 
point, those who violate the rule are seen as close to psychotic. After all, when 
a norm is universally accepted and enforced, who would defy the entire planet 
and unleash certain retribution on his state? The fact that the aggressive actor is 
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so “irrational” adds to the case for opposing him. For instance, Saddam 
Hussein’s reputation never recovered after the invasion of Kuwait, and this 
was perhaps why he was unsuccessful in regaining any degree of international 
acceptance over the course of the rest of his reign.333 
In sum, a norm becomes established because it is pushed by a powerful 
norm entrepreneur. If it has the qualities of an inherently compelling rule—
specificity and moral appeal—leaders will follow it to maintain a positive self-
image and a desirable reputation. Eventually, violation becomes unthinkable, 
and states will punish the few remaining rule-breakers, even at a cost. This 
only reinforces the normative pull of the norm, making compliance still more 
likely even in cases where a state may not expect to be sanctioned for a 
violation. 
B. Case Studies 
This Part provides three case studies to test the theory presented. To avoid 
biasing the inquiry, this Part will review two norms that “stuck”—the abolition 
of slavery and colonization—and one that has had much less success—the 
right to a decent standard of living. In the process, this Part shows that the two 
popular schools of analysis that tend to put more emphasis on material 
considerations, rational choice and Marxism, fail to explain why slavery and 
colonial rule ended when they did. In these cases, accounts stressing the power 
of ideas have much greater explanatory force.334 Indeed, states were often 
acting against their own interests when they took it upon themselves to 
eliminate slavery and colonialism.335 However, a requirement that individuals 
be guaranteed a decent standard of living has lacked a powerful norm 
entrepreneur. The idea also falls short on measures of specificity and moral 
appeal, unlike the causes of antislavery and anti-colonialism. Finally, I address 
how well the model explains both parts of the status quo bias of international 
law: the ban on classic invasions and the territorial integrity norm. Both parts 
of the status quo bias are specific and morally compelling, although the model 
presented predicts that the territorial integrity norm would be more robust than 
the ban on classic invasions. That is exactly what we see. 
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1. The British Outlaw Slavery 
Slavery had been an unquestioned part of virtually every developed 
civilization.336 With the beginnings of colonialism and the Industrial 
Revolution, however, it came to be practiced on a previously unimaginable 
scale.337 The international slave trade reached its peak in the last decades of the 
eighteenth century.338 During the 1790s, over 750,000 slaves were shipped to 
the West Indies, the United States, and Brazil.339 From 1791 to 1805, British 
ships carried fifty-two percent of the slaves shipped overseas, and partly as a 
result, British colonies produced fifty-five percent of the world’s sugar 
between 1805 and 1806.340 The country’s shares of both the slave and sugar 
trades were rising at this time.341 
In 1807, however, Great Britain officially ended its participation in the 
slave trade, becoming only the third country to do so.342 It made slave trading a 
capital offense seventeen years later.343 In 1833, Britain became the first state 
to free its slaves.344 It was not content to simply do away with the practice 
domestically, however. Until 1867, the state took it upon itself to use its global 
naval hegemony to end the slave trade all over the world, employing a mix of 
bribery and coercion against uncooperative governments.345 Great Britain’s 
efforts are credited with ending close to eighty percent of the international 
traffic of human beings.346 According to one estimate, the Royal Navy freed 
nearly 150,000 slaves between 1810 and 1864.347 In the second half of the 
1800s, Brazil and Cuba became two of the last major slave importers in the 
Western hemisphere to ban the import of slaves.348 By the twentieth century, 
there was no thriving international slave trade, and the scale was much lower 
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than it had been before the British’s efforts in the nineteenth century. Today, 
the prevalence of slavery in the world is near zero.349 
Britain’s campaign to end the slave trade from 1807 to 1867 was “the most 
expensive international moral effort in modern world history, with most of the 
cost paid by one country.”350 This poses obvious problems for realism, since 
Britain dominated the slave trade but expended blood and treasure over an 
extended period of time to win the freedom of strangers. About 5000 British 
lives were lost suppressing the slave trade.351 Between 1807 and 1842, British 
West Indian sugar production declined by almost twenty-five percent while 
competitor states that relied on slavery saw a 210 percent increase.352 In 1805, 
Britain produced fifty-five percent of the world’s sugar; by 1850, that number 
was down to fifteen percent.353 According to one estimate, the anti-slavery 
campaign cost Britain nearly two percent of its national income between 1808 
and 1867.354 The economic costs impacted all classes and were well 
understood by the general public.355 
Both free market thinkers and Marxists have maintained that the growth 
and decline of slavery could be explained by economics.356 Adam Smith 
argued that forced labor was inefficient, because the slave had no rational 
incentive to work hard.357 He predicted that owners would come to see that the 
production of slaves was not worth the costs of feeding and housing them.358 
Thus, the decisions of slaveholders and a free market would eventually replace 
slavery with paid labor.359 Marxists similarly argue that slavery ended when 
wage labor objectively became more profitable for the exploiting class.360 
These materialistic explanations, however, have not stood up to empirical 
scrutiny. While there was a time when scholars argued British sugar 
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production was in decline and that emancipation served Britain’s national 
interests, these views are no longer taken seriously.361 If slavery ended when it 
was no longer profitable, then it is reasonable to believe that it would have 
ended when owners voluntarily emancipated their slaves. In fact, all over the 
world, the opposite happened, with slaveholders clinging to the institution as 
long as possible, as in the American Civil War.362 Subsequent economic 
analysis proved that they were rational to do so; Britain suffered great 
economic losses as a result of abolition. Evidence from the United States also 
contradicts the idea that slavery ended because it ceased being efficient. In the 
run-up to the Civil War, per capita income in the American South was growing 
thirty percent faster than it was in the North.363 Capitalists in the rest of the 
country benefited from trade with the slaveholding states.364 Thus, nothing 
indicates that there was ever anything inherent to the economics of slavery that 
would have eventually led to its abolition. 
The prohibition against slavery has been codified in several international 
law documents. The Brussels Conference Act of 1890 sought to “prevent the 
capture of slaves and intercept the routes of the slave trade.”365 The 1926 
Slavery Convention called on all signatories “[t]o bring about, progressively 
and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms.”366 
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights has a similar clause.367 In 
1981, Mauritania became the last country to abolish slavery, although arguably 
the practice has not actually been eradicated there yet.368 
Slavery still exists, but not as an accepted practice. Just as there are killers 
and rapists but no one who actually defends murder or rape, there are 
slaveholders but no one who defends slavery. Even in Mauritania, the practice 
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continues because slaves often do not try to run away.369 This has led some to 
argue that what is called “slavery” by modern activists and NGOs is usually 
something closer to a caste system or economic relationships involving major 
power asymmetries.370 
The case of abolition fits into the model presented above. The “norm 
entrepreneur” can be considered British antislavery advocates or the British 
government. Great Britain was willing to incur the costs of creating an 
antislavery norm once public sentiment was overwhelmingly in favor of 
abolition. In 1787, the Committee for the Abolition of the Slave Trade was 
formed in Great Britain.371 Abolitionists sent 519 antislavery petitions with 
400,000 signatures to the House of Commons in 1792 alone.372 No issue had 
ever before generated a larger number of petitions over the course of one 
year.373 Rather than rely on economic arguments, these documents focused on 
the inhumanity of the slave trade.374 In 1814, Parliament received 800 petitions 
with one million signatures demanding that the British government encourage 
France to give up the slave trade.375 The public pressure continued to grow 
after Britain itself stopped trafficking in human beings. In early 1833, the year 
of the Emancipation Act, Parliament received over 5000 anti-slavery 
petitions.376 In addition to petitioning their elected representatives, abolitionists 
used economic pressure to make forced labor less profitable, with activists 
organizing boycotts against sugar made with slave labor in the early 1790s and 
again in the late 1820s.377 
The success of abolitionism in Britain and its eventual acceptance by 
international law are both due to the fact that a rule against slavery has the 
characteristics of a robust norm. The idea that human beings could not own 
one another is a simple one. Precise dates can be ascertained for when 
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countries abolished slavery without quibbling over what institutions do or do 
not count. The 1926 Slavery Convention calls slavery “the status or condition 
of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership are exercised.”378 This “remains the agreed upon definition of 
slavery in international law.”379 There may be other forms of exploitation, but 
they are not the same as the system of forced labor that ceased to exist in all 
developed countries over the course of the nineteenth century. 
The case for abolition is also morally clear.380 As soon as the 
Enlightenment was under way and individuals were expected to defend 
practices with reason, people quickly realized that slavery was unquestionably 
immoral. The moral foundations of forced labor were attacked by 
Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke and Jacques-Pierre Brisson.381 The 
cause of abolition in Britain picked up steam rapidly, as reflected in the 
number of petitions sent to Parliament over the years and the response by the 
government. But the time period is also marked for the inability of pro-slavery 
forces to make an acceptable moral case for their position. They relied on 
biblical arguments or claimed that abolition would harm British economic or 
national security interests.382 Elsewhere, particularly in the United States, some 
argued that Africans were naturally fit only to be slaves.383 This moral case 
relies on the best interests of the slaves but was easily refuted by the logic that 
lesser ability should not exclude one from the social contract. In addition, the 
fact that slaves celebrated abolition, rather than mourning its passing, 
discredited the paternalistic argument.384 
It is true that not all countries agreed that slavery was wrong when the 
moral case was presented to them, as entrenched interests and old ways of 
thinking were still very powerful.385 This is why British enforcement and the 
Civil War were necessary.386 But once the interests protecting slavery had been 
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destroyed, the practice did not reemerge in those countries that had abolished 
it, except in the case of France, which abolished slavery in 1794 and 
reinstituted it eight years later in some colonies.387 Established interests may 
block moral reform, but without anyone directly benefiting from a practice 
universally considered morally abhorrent, once banned it does not reemerge. 
2. Postwar Decolonization 
Colonialism has been defined as one government physically occupying and 
controlling the land of another people for the benefit of the occupying state.388 
Like slavery, it had been a near human universal for all of recorded history.389 
Also, as in the case of slavery, European states in the early modern era took the 
practice to new heights.390 At the end of World War II, Great Britain controlled 
land that today consists of more than two-dozen countries, including the areas 
in the modern states of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Jordan, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, and Nigeria.391 At the same time, France either ruled over or was a 
protectorate of Vietnam, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and a handful of modern 
states in sub-Saharan Africa.392 Part of the Congo was under the control of 
Belgium,393 and the Netherlands ruled Indonesia.394 Other European states had 
less significant colonial holdings.395 
Yet after World War II, each of these empires crumbled. This process 
started immediately after the war, as India gained independence in 1947, and 
Indonesia followed suit two years later.396 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
the process was completed when even the least developed territories under 
European rule became sovereign states. Among other holdings, Britain lost 
British Somaliland and Nigeria in 1960, Jamaica and Uganda in 1962, Kenya 
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and Zanzibar in 1963, and Bechuanland, Basutoland, and British Guiana in 
1966.397 France granted independence to Morocco and Tunisia in 1955 and 
1956, respectively.398 Between 1958 and 1960, fourteen sovereign states were 
formed out of former French territory in sub-Sahara Africa.399 
The materialist arguments regarding the decline of colonization are similar 
to those employed to explain the abolition of slavery.400 Supposedly, the 
practice ended when it ceased being profitable.401 Indeed, in some cases, force 
was instrumental. Algeria, for instance, was only granted independence after a 
bitter insurgency against the French.402 But in other cases, there was little to no 
resistance to European rule. While the North African Arabs struggled against 
the French, sub-Saharan Africans generally parted with their colonial rulers on 
amicable terms.403 As the 1950s went on, France became less and less willing 
to fight to hold on to its old colonies and by the end of the decade had no 
desire to continue ruling over them at all.404 
There is no economic or military reason that can wholly explain the rapid 
process of decolonization.405 In fact, postwar British and French leaders, 
including Charles de Gaulle and Winston Churchill, took the view that the 
colonies were more economically valuable than ever since they could 
contribute to the recovery effort.406 British colonial and cabinet documents 
from the era of decolonization talked of granting states independence not out 
of any idea that changes in military or economic interests made doing so 
necessary.407 Rather, these deliberations stressed public opinion and the views 
of the international community.408 
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Not only did Western states give up their own colonies, but they also 
condemned other states that tried to hold on to third world territories and 
occasionally punished them.409 In fact, aside from classic invasions, the only 
kind of aggression that has consistently drawn sanctions in the postwar era has 
been wars by Europeans to maintain colonial or apartheid systems and 
institutions.410 For example, while the Netherlands was fighting to maintain 
control of Indonesia, the colony’s independence was recognized by the U.N. 
Security Council.411 States promised aid to Indonesia, and Great Britain 
suspended arms and training it had previously agreed to provide to the 
Netherlands.412 When France was attempting to put down the rebellion in 
Algeria, even its closest allies refused to support the effort, and the General 
Assembly recognized Algeria’s right to independence years before the war was 
over.413 The pattern repeated itself when African insurgents resisted 
Portuguese rule in the 1960s and 70s.414 Communist and African states 
supported the Mozambique rebels and were instrumental in helping them 
finally achieve independence.415 
If material forces were the main factors behind decolonization, European 
countries would have given up their overseas territories at different times and 
there would be variations regarding which territories gained independence.416 
For instance, landlocked territories might have ceased being profitable while 
territories bordering oceans did not, or the degree of independence granted 
might have been related to the costs imposed on rulers by freedom fighters 
resisting foreign domination. It is also possible that all colonies ceased being 
profitable but only some states came to realize this fact. Instead, within the 
short time period of a few decades, almost every third world territory under 
Western control gained independence and joined the state system.417 This 
happened regardless of who the colonial ruler was, whether the territory was 
resource rich, whether the region had strategic value, or whether the natives 
violently resisted foreign occupation. 
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Decolonization is best explained by the international community’s embrace 
of the concept of self-determination. While the idea is often traced to the 
French Revolution, it was not given “quasi-official status” in international law 
until the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.418 The norm entrepreneur was the 
Wilson administration, which was instrumental in creating the League of 
Nations. The fifth of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points called for “[a] free, 
open-minded . . . . adjustment of all colonial claims,” under the principle that 
the wishes of the people being ruled were to be given equal weight to the 
interests of the government in question.419 The Covenant of the League of 
Nations made the “advanced nations” responsible for helping the states that 
had become independent as a result of the war develop their institutions.420 In 
effect, the document declared that some regions were closer than others to 
being ready for self-government. 
Some states were indeed granted full sovereignty in the interwar period.421 
But while those that had been ruled by the Axis Powers gained their 
independence, France and Britain in particular held on to their overseas 
territories.422 Yet once the right of self-determination was enshrined into 
international law, it became difficult to justify why only territories that had 
been controlled by countries that lost World War I deserved their freedom. The 
period of decolonization followed the same pattern as the abolition of slavery: 
those who wanted to end the unpopular practice made primarily moral 
arguments, while defenders made a practical case that purported to take 
account of the interests of the people subordinated.423 
Those who tried to forestall decolonization relied on the same logic that 
had motivated Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The U.N. 
Charter followed in the footsteps of its predecessor, affirming the principle of 
self-determination but also paternalism. Colonial powers were obliged “to 
develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the 
peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free 
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political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory 
and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement.”424 
In the following decades, however, self-determination came to be seen as a 
right that people inherently held and one that was divorced from utilitarian 
logic and notions of paternalism.425 History, culture, degree of ethnic 
fragmentation in the colony, and the level of its institutional or economic 
development were irrelevant. Jackson writes that today, “it would be about as 
hard for an independent country to become a colony—even if the people voted 
to do so—as it would be for citizens of a democracy to sell themselves into 
slavery.”426 By the 1960s, few leaders were “prepared to defend 
[colonialism’s] legitimacy and lawfulness in public.”427 
While President Wilson called for self-determination for “peoples,” the 
right to independence was granted to various colonies, many of which were 
ethnically and culturally heterogeneous.428 But true ethnic and cultural self-
determination was and is problematic—there are endless ways to divide 
different “peoples.” The lines of the third world drawn by the European powers 
were arbitrary, but, putting aside a few isolated cases, it would have been 
difficult to divide Africa and Asia into true nation-states in a nonarbitrary 
way.429 Therefore, self-determination came to mean the right of individual 
countries or former colonies to rule their own affairs if they saw themselves as 
distinct enough from the master country, whether a sense of nationhood had 
developed in the territory or not.430 
Once the existence of states was taken as a given and the United Nations 
was established based on the equality of states, the anticolonization norm could 
have been expected to be robust. It applied universally and was specific. 
Britain has no more right to rule over Uganda than Uganda does to rule over 
Britain. The moral case against colonialism could have been challenged on the 
basis of utilitarian logic, as it has been argued that some developing countries 
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were simply not ready for independence.431 Yet, the world was moving away 
from these kinds of paternalistic arguments and they have become 
unacceptable in discourse over civil and human rights.432 Perhaps a blanket 
rule against colonialism was based on the worry that once an exception for less 
“developed” areas was granted, the natives would be stigmatized and the 
colonial powers would simply look after their own interests while fooling 
themselves and others into believing that they were behaving altruistically. But 
regardless of the “inherent” moral argument for an absolute ban on 
colonization, such a norm is perfectly coherent with the general intellectual 
currents of the last century. When this fact is combined with the specificity of 
the rule, it is hard to see how a leader could test its parameters and delude 
himself into believing he is acting appropriately, or justify his actions before 
the international community. 
3. The Right to a Decent Standard of Living 
In order to see what an effective norm looks like, it is helpful to look at one 
that is much less robust: the right to a decent standard of living.433 The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948 by the General 
Assembly, guarantees every individual “a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family,” which includes basic 
provisions of “food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social 
services, and the right to security” in case of disability or advanced age.434 
From a legalist perspective, although part of a nonbinding resolution, this 
standard of living provision should matter a great deal.435 Less than two 
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decades later, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights included a very similar provision.436 
Despite the hopes of many international lawyers, however, the international 
community does not yet force states to provide their citizens disability benefits, 
support for the elderly, or any of the other programs of the modern welfare 
state. When Americans debated health care reform during President Obama’s 
first term, anyone who suggested that international law required Congress to 
pass the Affordable Care Act437 would have been ignored, if not widely 
derided. In fact, some conservatives were proud that the United States 
remained an international outlier in not providing universal healthcare, seeing 
it as a positive example of “American exceptionalism.”438 
The failure of this international norm can be explained by the model 
presented. First of all, there was never a powerful norm entrepreneur that 
forced states to adopt a welfare state. The most powerful countries of the last 
two centuries, Great Britain and the United States, have had relatively laissez-
faire economic policies by world standards.439 They have opposed communism 
but have generally neither encouraged other states to adopt generous welfare 
policies nor discouraged them. Unsurprisingly, neither the U.N. Charter nor its 
predecessor, the Covenant of the League of Nations, mentions anything about 
domestic redistributionist policies. In fact, by affirming sovereign rights in the 
domestic sphere, these documents arguably precluded international law from 
requiring states to guarantee citizens a minimum standard of living. While the 
Soviet Union was a powerful actor that stressed the primacy of positive rights, 
it was never in the dominant global position that Britain and the United States 
were in in the late nineteenth century and after World War II respectively. 
Furthermore, communist states, because of their records, lacked the moral 
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capital to make the causes they championed seem compelling.440 It is little 
wonder, then, that across the world communist governments were only able to 
come to power through force. 
Even if the Soviet Union could be considered a sufficiently strong moral 
entrepreneur, the standard of living norm lacks any degree of specificity. 
People disagree about what level of health care, disability insurance, and other 
benefits are sufficient for an “adequate” standard of living. Over the past 
several decades, all segments of the American population have seen an 
increase in overall living standards.441 By many measures, such as height and 
nutritional intake, the average poor Americans today are better off than middle 
class Americans of the 1950s.442 But government agencies continue to find 
tens of millions of Americans living in “poverty” by simply changing the 
definition of the term as living standards improve.443 This malleable definition 
shows how difficult it is to determine an adequate standard of living. A 
standard of living norm thus lacks any objective standards a would-be enforcer 
can point to, and thus specificity. 
The standard of living norm also lacks moral clarity. One survey found that 
Americans named the Bible as the book that most influenced their lives, with 
Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged in second place.444 Rand’s novel put forth a 
utilitarian critique of the welfare state, but her main arguments were moral.445 
Individuals were said to have a right to contract with one another and have 
their agreements enforced, and the state was to do no more than was absolutely 
necessary for a consent-based society to function.446 Some philosophers make 
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similar arguments in a more systemized fashion, putting a great deal of 
emphasis on the distinction between acts of commission and omission, or the 
granting of positive and negative rights.447 Jonathan Haidt has found that 
cultures universally value the idea of fairness.448 But, in the American context, 
to conservatives it means people getting what they deserve, while liberals are 
more concerned with achieving an equitable distribution of resources.449 This 
moral divide of modern American politics stems from whether persons are 
inclined to view “fairness” as requiring proportionality—i.e. to each what is his 
due—or equality.450 
This is not to say that there are not good moral arguments for the welfare 
state. From a purely utilitarian perspective, the declining marginal utility of 
money may justify taking from the rich and giving to the poor.451 But Haidt 
finds that educated, modern Westerners are unique in believing that morality is 
only about fairness and harm, or that decisions regarding political and social 
issues should solely be based on utilitarian calculations.452 Those who believe 
that arguments against the welfare state will one day be as unacceptable as 
arguments against abolition are likely to be disappointed. As of June 2012, the 
vast majority of governments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America did not even 
provide their citizens universal healthcare.453 In the first American presidential 
debate of 2012, Mitt Romney accused President Obama of engineering a 
“government takeover” of the healthcare industry, something that the 
incumbent denied.454 Unlike the abolitionist position, which took off relatively 
soon after it was presented to democratic publics, many Americans and other 
educated people with access to uncensored media have heard the arguments for 
the welfare state and rejected them.455 They may be wrong, but, their positions 
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are not absurd and destined to fail because of some inherent contradiction with 
other, more fundamental moral ideas. 
Attempts to create a standard of living norm through international law have 
failed. States do not pressure other governments to provide their own citizens 
with education or healthcare. Despite claims that it has been part of 
international law for decades, the standard of living norm has not inspired 
protests or demands that foreign countries adopt more generous domestic 
welfare policies. 
C. The Inherent Appeal of the Status Quo Bias 
The status quo bias of international law has two parts: a ban on classic 
invasions and forcibly taking territory.456 Here, I show that both parts of the 
status quo bias fit into the model presented. 
1. The Ban on Classic Invasions 
International law did not ban any interstate use of force until the conclusion 
of World War I.457 Influenced by the Anglo-American peace movement and 
Christian progressivism, Woodrow Wilson announced his support for a league 
of states that would keep the peace once the war was over.458 After that, every 
major combatant supported some form of collective security arrangement.459 
The Americans and British were again on the winning side of World War II, 
and were able to design a postwar order in their image. 
The moral case against interstate aggression can be stated quite clearly. It is 
simply the “Golden Rule” applied to foreign affairs: Do not harm others 
because you would not want them to harm you. Before World War I, major 
intellectuals wrote about war as a heroic and invigorating experience.460 Yet as 
first-hand accounts from World War I became available, and film allowed 
people to see graphic images of injured and mutilated soldiers and civilians, 
this romantic vision of armed conflict was discredited.461  
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 459 Id. at 115. 
 460 PINKER, supra note 130, at 242–43. 
 461 Id. at 246–47. 
HANANIA GALLEYSPROOFS 4/14/2014 10:24 AM 
2013] NORMS GOVERNING THE INTERSTATE USE OF FORCE 899 
However, the U.N. Charter lacks complete specificity. It contains some 
exceptions that are subject to interpretation. In particular, much debate centers 
around the inherent right of self-defense protected by Article 51.462 The 
concept of humanitarian intervention remains controversial because it is the 
terrain on which two broad intellectual trends meet. Conceptualizing states as 
individuals with rights leads to support for a ban on interstate aggression,463 
while the application of utilitarian logic seems to suggest that one state has the 
duty to prevent atrocities from being committed in another when it can do so at 
a relatively low cost.464 Adding to the ambiguity, the Security Council can act 
to stop aggression and arguably has the right to define the term.465 Thus, the 
ban on classic invasions lacks the specificity of the ban on colonization, for 
example. 
At the same time, the exceptions and grey areas are not so large that they 
swallow the rule. Certain kinds of interstate aggression are unthinkable. 
Leaders cannot invade their neighbors for territorial gain or plunder and still 
see themselves as behaving in a way that is appropriate for a political figure. 
While a state may deceive itself into believing that it is acting in self-defense 
when it is actually engaging in aggression, the need for plausible deniability 
creates certain limits to the degree to which humans may behave immorally.466 
Importantly, each state knows that its neighbor is not going to invade unless it 
can do so in a way that still shows respect for the norm.467 
This argument requires that at least some wars be considered illegal by 
most or all of the world community. There is nothing problematic about this 
assumption. While grey areas that pose difficult moral and legal questions 
exist, this does not mean that the larger rule is nonexistent. Just as most 
individuals never seriously consider murdering other people, few leaders need 
 
 462 See supra notes 198–201 and accompanying text. 
 463 See supra Part I.B. 
 464 See supra Part I.C. 
 465 See supra Part I.E (showing that different interpretations can justify certain types of aggression). 
 466 See supra notes 283–96 and accompanying text. 
 467 This has important implications for what international relations scholars call the security dilemma. 
This is a situation where two states may want peace with one another, but neither can be aware of the 
intentions of its neighbor. Thus, each ends up behaving aggressively in order to be in a better position to 
defend itself, and measures taken out of a concern for self-preservation are seen as threatening. Yet small 
changes to initial conditions can make all the difference. If the entire international community values the status 
quo, and one’s neighbor has to some extent internalized this norm and values its own reputation, then states 
have less of a need to prepare for the worst kinds of naked aggression. See Glenn H. Snyder, The Security 
Dilemma in Alliance Politics, 36 WORLD POL. 461 (1984). 
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to think about the sanctions resulting from a classic invasion before deciding to 
refrain from engaging in interstate aggression. In extreme cases, international 
sanctions have been used. While the ban on classic invasions may be fuzzy at 
its borders, there is a core to the rule that creates an effective international 
norm. 
2. The Territorial Integrity Norm 
The bans on territorial aggrandizement through force and classic invasions 
have been intertwined since the beginning of the twentieth century. Clauses in 
both the League of Nations Covenant and U.N. Charter express respect for the 
territorial integrity of states.468 The moral case against using force to take a 
neighbor’s territory is clear. People generally want to see their state preserved. 
From the “perspective of the universe,” no sovereign state has the right to take 
territory from another. 
The territorial integrity norm is also very specific. Therefore, since 1945, 
states that have sought to forcibly change well-established borders have been 
sanctioned.469 While the classic invasion ban has grey areas, the territorial 
integrity norm does not. The international community understands clearly 
whether a state has seized territory that belongs to another state. Nearly four 
decades of absolute compliance with the territorial integrity norm casts doubt 
on rationalist explanations for this feature of international law. Modern 
conditions may very well have made territorial aggrandizement less 
economically rational than it has been in the past, but even if this were the 
case, absent the territorial integrity norm, self-interested states could be 
expected to occasionally midjudge this fact and launch wars to seize territory. 
The territorial integrity norm has not been disturbed by the growing 
acceptance of humanitarian intervention or strikes against terrorism. For even 
if intervening to stop atrocities in a country is justifiable, the intervening state 
cannot make a case as to why it should annex the territory of the target. While 
the international community may have pushed for the breakup of Yugoslavia, 
the involved powers sought the creation of new states rather than allowing 
Kosovo to join Albania or the United States.470 The absolute ban on territorial 
 
 468 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; League of Nations Covenant art. 10. 
 469 See supra Part I.B. 
 470 See Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolutoin of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 569 (1992). 
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aggrandizement through force has likely decreased the likelihood of aggression 
accompanied by self-serving claims of self-defense or humanitarian 
motivations. 
D. Towards an Abolition of War? 
In reviewing the history of the abolition of slavery, some scholars find 
reasons to be optimistic about the potential of abolishing war.471 While some 
claim that armed conflict is natural and inevitable, in the past much of the same 
had been said about slavery.472 The rules against colonization, slavery, and 
aggressive war share a common moral core. They are all based on the general 
principle that it is wrong to use force to extract benefits from others.473 In the 
model presented here, once some version of the “Golden Rule” or non-
exploitation principle is accepted, norms survive and proliferate via the 
escalator of reason and the desire of each psychologically normal individual to 
maintain a positive reputation and self-image. The importance of ideas in 
shaping international law is reflected in the fact that there is a great deal of 
similarity between each of the successful norms reviewed and the failure of 
economic explanations to fully account for the development of these rules.474 
We are a long way from the abolition of war. But, the trends have been 
headed in the right direction.475 And while desire for territory has been the 
main cause of war throughout history, states no longer use force to take land 
from one another.476 Without the possibility of accomplishing the most 
historically common major aim of war, the option of initiating armed conflict 
has unsurprisingly become less appealing to world leaders, including the rare 
individuals that do not internalize international norms and simply behave in a 
self-interested manner. The model and empirical evidence combine to provide 
a plausible account of how international law can influence state behavior even 
in a system traditionally thought to be anarchic and when the most important 
state interests are at stake. 
 
 471 Ray, supra note 307, at 406. 
 472 Id. at 405–06. 
 473 Id. at 422–29. 
 474 See supra Part I. 
 475 See Ray, supra note 307, at 425–29. 
 476 See supra Part I.B. 
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CONCLUSION 
From the moment states began interacting with one another, they have 
engaged in armed conflict.477 Until the twentieth century, few thought that it 
was possible that states would ever stop trying to overthrow the rulers of other 
states or seize foreign territory. Without an international leviathan analogous to 
a domestic government, it has been argued, states would always interact with 
one another in a state of anarchy.478 In fact, it was not until after the First 
World War that any form of interstate aggression was prohibited by 
international law.479 The period immediately following the founding of the 
League of Nations is often emphasized for the lessons in supposedly teached 
about not being naïve regarding the prospects of international law leading to 
orderly interactions.480  
After World War II, however, most states gave up on classic invasions and 
in the majority of situations many sanctioned the few states that did not adopt 
this new norm.481 Further, no state has taken territory from another by force in 
close to four decades.482 There is thus a status quo bias in how the international 
community treats the interstate use of force—the more destabilizing a military 
action is, the more likely the world community is to sanction the aggressor.483 
By any reasonable definition, there is a coherent doctrine of international law 
governing the interstate use of force. 
While realism is still an important paradigm in international relations, its 
influence has waned over the last few decades.484 Approaches that rely on 
political psychology are better suited to explain the status quo bias of 
international law regarding the use of force.485 If states only cared about 
security and power, then one would have to maintain that every state in the 
world decided that it no longer had an interest in seizing territory from other 
states at about the same time. The abolitionist and decolonization movements 
stand as perhaps the two clearest historical precedents showing the importance 
 
 477 See STEVEN A. LEBLANC & KATHERINE E. REGISTER, CONSTANT BATTLES 1–4 (2003). 
 478 But see supra Part 1. 
 479 See League of Nations Covenant art. 10. 
 480 See e.g., WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 1; KELSEN, supra note 2, at 266. 
 481 See supra Part I.B. 
 482 See Zacher, supra note 97, at 234. 
 483 See supra Part I. 
 484 See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
 485 See supra Part II.A. 
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of ideas in shaping international law.486 These norms share the same 
underlying logic, which is that no individual or group has the right to use force 
to dominate another.487 This reasoning has over time naturally come to be 
extended to issues of war and peace.488 
None of this is to say that in international relations relative power between 
states is unimportant. Perhaps, states ignore international law when making 
policy in areas that are not traditionally governed by global norms, or in those 
where there is more ambiguity regarding appropriate rules. But once a norm 
entrepreneur has created a rule of international law that is specific and morally 
compelling, the norm can shape behavior.489 This is especially true when the 
idea fits into the larger intellectual climate of the era. Today, classic invasions 
are rare, and when they occur the aggressor state tends to be punished.490 
National leaders who do not internalize the rules of international law are at 
least deterred by the sanctions they would face for beginning wars. 
Political psychology explains why it makes sense to believe that leaders 
internalize rules of international law and punish aggressors out of a sense of 
moral conviction. In laboratory settings, people only behave in ways they 
consider immoral to the extent to which they can maintain “plausible 
deniability” and see themselves as acting in conformance with social norms. 
The rule against classic invasions is somewhat fuzzy, but virtually everyone 
agrees certain cases qualify. In any particular instance, it is easy to discern 
whether the territorial integrity norm is being followed. Its prohibition on 
forcible annexation takes what has historically been the main motivation for 
war off the table. When states know they will not forcibly lose territory, they 
are less likely to seize land as a defensive measure, which has important 
implications for the security dilemma.491 
Furthermore, we have also seen that individuals punish norm violators or 
cheaters, even when the sanctioning party has nothing to gain by doing so.492 
This helps to explain why states sanction governments that violate the norms 
maintaining the international status quo. Any actors that still wish to behave as 
 
 486 Supra Part II.B 1 & 2. 
 487 Id. 
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 490 See supra Introduction. 
 491 See SNYDER, supra note 467, at 469–70. 
 492 See supra Part I.A. 
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more completely self-interested units must take this into account when 
deciding whether to go to war. As the forms of prohibited aggression become 
less common, violators send an even larger signal indicating that they are 
mentally unbalanced or otherwise unfit to be leaders of a modern state. 
Some may argue that the status quo bias of international law is not ideal, or 
even desirable. John Yoo, for example, writes that it is far from self-evident 
“that the desirable level of force, apart from examples of self-defense, in the 
international system is in fact zero.”493 According to this train of thought, to 
the extent that it is followed, this bias prevents the international community 
from dealing with the modern threats of terrorism, intrastate humanitarian 
disasters, and rogue states.494 Similarly, Glennon argues that there should be a 
legalist regime that allows for humanitarian intervention, even as he concedes 
that such wars cannot currently be considered legal under international law.495 
Whatever the merits to these arguments, it is only by clearly understanding 
what modern norms are good for—whether and how they influence state 
behavior—that we can more carefully think about whether they should be 
changed. If economic and technological changes made the decline of classic 
invasions and territorial aggrandizement through force inevitable, then there 
may be little risk in tinkering with the current rules governing the interstate use 
of force. On the other hand, if international law is biased towards preserving 
the status quo as a result growing humanitarian sentiment and the two world 
wars, then changing the rules governing the interstate use of force may risk the 
stability of the world order. James Fearon argues that the international 
community should reject attempts at secession because weakening the norm in 
favor of preserving territorial integrity could embolden other actors to fight for 
independence, and thus lead to more armed conflict.496 Similarly, if a principle 
of humanitarian intervention came to be more widely accepted, the parameters 
of the norm against classic invasions would become fuzzier than they already 
are. This could make it easier for states to justify attacking others for self-
interested reasons. Encouraging more armed conflict is especially dangerous in 
an era of weapons of mass destruction. It may or may not be worth taking this 
 
 493 Yoo, supra note 11, at 782. 
 494 Id. at 749–51. 
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 496 James D. Fearon, Separatist Wars, Partition, and World Order, 13 SECURITY STUD. 394, 397, 404–15 
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risk to, for example, develop a new norm allowing states to stop governments 
that are committing atrocities against their own people. 
On the other hand, perhaps a loosening of the norm banning classic 
invasions would not lead to more armed conflict, because the territorial 
integrity norm would remain clear and put a limit on self-serving and 
hypocritical behavior. Either way, a basic review of the history of changes in 
international behavior shows how influential moral ideas about right and 
wrong can be. Proposed changes must therefore be considered in a holistic 
manner, all the while taking into account cognitive biases and potential 
adjustments in incentive structures. A complete cost-benefit analysis of 
reforming the international system must include the chances and harms of 
weakening the norms underlying the status quo bias of international law 
regarding the interstate use of force. 
 
